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ABSTRACT
Robert Bork, former judge for the District of Columbia Circuit
and antitrust scholar, has characterized the social and political
goals underlying merger law as "pure intellectual mush."' Social
and political values have formed the foundation of the most fa-
mous United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting section
7 of the Clayton Act,2 the primary statutory standard for judging
the legality of corporate acquisitions. Judge Bork's dismissive and
derogatory comments challenge both judges and scholars to pro-
vide a rigorous intellectual foundation and a procedure for incor-
porating these values into the merger law enforcement process.
Current trends in antitrust policy also force decision makers to
confront directly whether anything is wrong with mergers other
than the potential increase in market power associated with one
firm's acquisition of stock or assets of another. The statutory stan-
dards in the Clayton Act for judging the legality of mergers have
not been amended since 1950, but courts have differed widely in
their application of those standards-from the per se, populist ap-
proach of the Warren Court to the rule-of-reason, economic effi-
ciency approach of the Burger Court. In the past, proposed amend-
ments to the Clayton Act 3 have recommended prohibiting all
mergers between large firms on the grounds that bigness is bad for
social and political reasons. The current trend, however, is toward
enforcement and statutory amendments based on economic theo-
ries that would permit mergers regardless of the size of the firms
involved if the merger would not lead to an excessive increase in
market power. The proposed Merger Modernization Act of 1986,4
reintroduced as part of the omnibus "competitiveness" package of
the Reagan administration in 19875 would, by statutory amend-
ment, eliminate from consideration in merger cases all concerns
1. Panel Discussion: Merger Enforcement and Practice, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 233, 238
(1982) (comments of R. Bork).
2. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-732 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1982)).
3. See Mergers and Economic Concentration, 1979: Hearings on S. 600 Before the Sub-
comm. on Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
4. H.R. 4247, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
5. S. 634, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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other than those associated with market power. It is important,
then, to appreciate the nature or character of those social and po-
litical goals not served by an exclusively economic orientation. This
focus is likely to continue during the Bush administration.'
This Article focuses attention on goals other than economic effi-
ciency by contrasting them to economic goals both in terms of
their substantive content and their underlying assumptions. Alter-
native articulations of the nonefficiency goals are examined to state
as precisely as possible what legislators, judges, and scholars had in
mind when advocating these goals. Although one can easily appre-
ciate the political and social values scholars and policy makers es-
pouse, it is difficult to identify from the current literature in this
area either the connection between mergers generally and undesir-
able consequences or those particular mergers most likely to have
unwanted side effects. Although this Article calls for greater speci-
ficity and precision by proponents of nonefficiency goals, it also ar-
gues that many of these goals can be included systematically in
antitrust enforcement. In response to the appeal of social and po-
litical values and their established place in antitrust cases, this Ar-
ticle suggests a more dynamic and democratic interpretation of ec-
onomic efficiency that incorporates a broader spectrum of values.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Antitrust, Economics, and Politics
Antitrust scrutiny of corporate acquisitions of the stock or assets
of other corporations relies heavily, if not exclusively, on econom-
ics.7 The federal administrative officers with primary responsibility
6. At the time of preparation of this Article for publication, there is no indication that the
administration of President Bush will change the focus of antitrust enforcement from effi-
ciency goals to social and political goals in the merger area. Such commentary as exists
suggests that the main themes of the Reagan agenda in the antitrust arena will continue.
See, e.g., Looking Forward: Antitrust in the Bush Administration, 3 ANTITRUST 6 (Spring
1989) ("Basically, there will be continuity.").
7. Former Attorney General Edwin Meese, III, stated that the Reagan administration's
review of the antitrust laws was based on an attempt to effect changes that will "benefit
consumers and businesses alike. The contribution of economics to the law in this area has
been of vital importance." Meese Lauds Role Played by Economists in Restoring Sanity to
Antitrust Laws, 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1250, at 187-88 (Jan. 30, 1986).
"'[W]e have seen dramatic evidence how economic ideas can help bring sanity to the law.'
Antitrust analysis based on sound economic thinking 'has helped slash through the thickets
790 [Vol. 30:787
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for enforcement of the antitrust laws explicitly identify the preser-
vation of an efficient marketplace as their goal." The Justice De-
of bad antitrust case law.'" Id. at 187. In defense of antitrust reform, Meese said that "[t]he
time has come to reform private antitrust remedies" and believed that such reform should
be based on current economic thinking. Id.
8. Several generations of Assistant Attorneys General for the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department have described their enforcement priorities along economic lines. For-
mer Assistant Attorney General Douglas H. Ginsburg said that the Antitrust Division's ob-
jective with respect to enforcement priorities is "to forestall private conduct inimical to
competition and to ensure that antitrust enforcement, both public and private, does not
discourage business firms from efficient procompetitive conduct." Shift in Analytical Ap-
proach Highlights Antitrust Conference, 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1240,
at 829 (Nov. 14, 1985). Ginsburg told the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Monopolies
that, applying sound economic and legal principles, the Division stood "ready, able and will-
ing to block" mergers and acquisitions that would result in the facilitation of collusion or an
expansion of a firm with significant market power. Ginsburg Defends Administration's Rec-
ord and Proposals to Achieve Antitrust Reform, 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1255, at 399 (Mar. 6, 1986).
Speaking about the administration's antitrust policy, J. Paul McGrath, former Assistant
Attorney General of the Antitrust Division, said:
The objective is to preserve competition, which is important to our free-market
system. Where competition may be hindered by mergers or by other kinds of
conduct, obviously we should do something about it. On the other hand, we
should not interfere with transactions that aren't likely to lessen competition.
Most mergers do not lessen competition, do not create economic dislocations
and therefore should not be attacked.
McGrath, We Harm the Economy if We Artificially Restrict Mergers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., May 14, 1984, at 77. McGrath characterized antitrust enforcement as changing with
our understanding of the economy and the antitrust rules followed by enforcers today as
focusing on economic efficiency and consumer welfare, regardless of size. ABA Section
Meeting Examines Facets of Proposed Legislation, 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1261, at 665 (Apr. 17,1986). Donald I. Baker, another former Division Chief, observed
that antitrust in the United States "has coincided with our gradual rise to economic promi-
nence in the non-Communist world. We have thus been spared the hard choices of whether
competition and antitrust would in fact produce better 'political' results for our citizens."
Yet today, "as during the Great Depression, broad public faith in competition seems to have
declined, and we have to worry about the legislative consequences of such decline." Shift in
Analytical Approach Highlights Antitrust Conference, supra, at 832. He recognized two
themes running through antitrust cases and literature: one, a concern with "economic effi-
ciency," the other, "a populist concern about entrepreneurial independence and equality."
Id. According to Baker, competition "tends to provide the most effective spur to imagina-
tion and efficiency- simply because it rewards the successful innovator and cost-cutter,
while penalizing the economic laggard." Evisceration of Antitrust Enforcement Scored Dur-
ing House Oversight Hearing, 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1254, at 351 (Feb.
27, 1986). William F. Baxter, former Division Chief, pointed out that antitrust doctrine in
the mid-1980s, as distinguished from one or two decades ago, was more disciplined and more
national, Conference Board Probes Trends of Enforcement, Economic Theory, 50 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1257, at 473 (Mar. 20, 1986); however, Senator Howard M.
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partment Antitrust Division Guidelines, which the Federal Trade
Commission follows to a great extent,9 reflect this focus by identi-
fying a myriad of market characteristics that are relevant to an
antitrust inquiry. Industrial organization economists traditionally
identify these characteristics as being the determinants of whether
a firm, either alone or in conjunction with others, has power to
influence the price in a market.' 0 Senior Reagan administration of-
ficials maintained that their view of the goals and purposes of the
antitrust law of mergers was consistent with Supreme Court prece-
dent and did not reflect a change in policy. According to those offi-
cials, the Guidelines were designed to create certainty in the busi-
Metzenbaum characterized Baxter as a "known opponent of the antitrust laws." Shift in
Analytical Approach Highlights Antitrust Conference, supra, at 831.
Commissioners of the FTC have similarly expressed their concern with maintaining the
competitiveness of the marketplace as the primary if not exclusive goal of antitrust law.
FTC Chairman Daniel Oliver stated that the FTC's role "is to protect the freedom of the
market - to police the market in order to correct, where possible, imperfections that may
exist - by promoting competition among businesses and by protecting consumers from being
deprived of the ability to make adequately informed purchases." Oliver, Strenio Confirma-
tions to FTC Posts Seem Likely Soon, 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1254, at
355 (Feb. 27, 1986). He offered support for the Reagan administration's Merger Moderniza-
tion Act of 1986 because it was a "constructive step in the ongoing effort to achieve economi-
cally rational enforcement policy" under Clayton Act § 7. Oliver Calls § 7 Proposal "Con-
structive Step" To Rational Enforcement Policy, 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1267, at 934 (May 29, 1986). Describing the antitrust reform package, James C. Miller,
III, former FTC chairman, stated that the package is a "modernization" of the antitrust
laws, "not a repeal." Miller told reporters that the package affirmed the Reagan administra-
tion's belief that antitrust laws promoted competition. He said that the bills furthered the
administration's goal of maximizing competition by making it "achievable." Reagan Admin-
istration Unveils Antitrust Reform Package; Rodino Attacks Proposals, 50 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1253, at 307 (Feb. 20, 1986). FTC Commissioner Mary
Azcuenaga stated, with respect to the enforcement of Clayton Act § 7, that the goal is to
protect competitive opportunities for American business. Shift in Analytical Approach
Highlights Antitrust Conference, supra, at 831. Commisssioner Andrew J. Strenio, Jr.
stated, however, that the FTC should "promote the welfare of American consumers both
through fostering competition in the marketplace and enforcing rules designed to protect
consumers when there is market failure." Oliver, Strenio Confirmations to FTC Posts Seem
Likely Soon, supra, at 355.
9. Baxter, Miller Defend Merger Guidelines Before Senate Judiciary Committee Hear-
ing, 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1074, at 231 (July 22, 1982).
10. See Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,101,
13,102 and 13,103.
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ness world, so that private decision makers will know which
acquisitions are likely to be challenged. 1
Scholars have disagreed about whether the Justice Department
Guidelines actually change the law. 2 The efficient operation of
markets has not always been the sole concern of the Court in
merger cases. For instance, Justice Douglas' opinions reflect a con-
cern for the workers and communities affected by mergers and the
preservation of small businesses to encourage the entrepreneurial
spirit.'3 These opinions also indicate affirmative disapproval of
mergers that result in one of the merging partners having a com-
petitive advantage in its market due to a less costly way of doing
business.'4 Courts and Congress have suggested that some current
policy statements of Justice Department antitrust enforcers do not
reflect the law accurately.15 Academic commentators and scholars
11. See Schwartz, The New Merger Guidelines: Guide to Governmental Discretion and
Private Counseling or Propaganda for Revision of the Antitrust Laws?, 71 CALIF. L. REV.
575 (1983).
12. See id.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 543 (1973) (Douglas,
J., concurring in part).
14. In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1967), Justice Douglas, writing
for the Court, objected to the acquisition of Clorox Co. by Procter & Gamble on the
grounds, among others, that economies of scale in advertising would give Procter & Gamble
an impermissible competitive edge over competitors in the bleach market. The Court af-
firmed a FTC decision that had
rejectied] as specious in law and unfounded in fact, the argument that the
Commission ought not, for the sake of protecting the "inefficient" small firms
in the industry, proscribe a merger so productive of "efficiencies." The short
answer to this argument is that, in a proceeding under section 7, economic
efficiency or any other social benefit resulting from a merger is pertinent only
insofar as it may tend to promote or retard the vigor of competition.
In re Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1580 (1963). Robert Bork and Ward Bowman,
Jr. argue that this perverse viewpoint turns the normal order of policy around. Bork & Bow-
man, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 374 (1965). But
see Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV.
1580 (1983) (thoroughly reviews the efficiencies defense and examines practical considera-
tions involved in the balancing of allocative and productive efficiency goals).
15. In the federal courts, a number of opinions reflect this concern. See Allis Chalmers
Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 414 F.2d 506, 524 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1009 (1970) (courts will pay the Merger Guidelines some deference, but they do not have the
force of law and are in no way binding); United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F.
Supp. 1271, 1280 (W.D. Pa. 1977). See also United States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.,
353 U.S. 586, 590 (1957) (any failure on the part of the Department to challenge a merger
does not constitute a binding administrative interpretation that the merger is not violative
of the Clayton Act); Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 353-54 (2d Cir. 1979) (the Guide-
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also disagree about the appropriate focus of merger law policy.
Scholars such as Professors Schwartz 6 and Curran 7 emphasize the
goals of diversity and equal opportunity while denying that Su-
preme Court opinions reflect a concern for efficiency alone. Profes-
sor Flynn"s and numerous others 9 criticize the economic efficiency
emphasis as relying on sweeping assumptions, hidden value
choices, and a cloister mentality that systematically excludes val-
ues such as equity, fairness, and justice. On the other hand, com-
mentators such as Bork decry the uncertainty, and, indeed, the un-
constitutionality, 0 of delegating to judges the power to determine
the propriety of mergers under the "loose, mock-Jeffersonian"'
standards suggested by those who emphasize nonefficiency goals.
Professor Elzinga22 argues that many of the sQcial and political val-
ues are already incorporated into the efficiency perspective and
need not be given separate attention.
The revealed intent of the Reagan administration was to elimi-
nate from the Clayton Act any ambiguity surrounding the goals
underlying the law. The proposed Merger Modernization Act
would have amended section 7 of the Clayton Act so that courts
would focus attention exclusively on the ability of merging firms to
lines are simply an attempt to explain which mergers are most likely to have anticompeti-
tive effects); Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 414 F.2d at 524 (Guidelines are standards that the
Department will apply in determining whether to challenge a merger); United States v. At-
lantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (the Guidelines are not even
binding on the Department of Justice), aff'd sub nom. Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S.
986 (1971). See generally Cann, The New Merger Guidelines-Is the Department of Justice
Enforcing the Law?, 21 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 41-42 (1983).
16. Schwartz, Institutional Size and Individual Liberty: Authoritarian Aspect of Big-
ness, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 4 (1960)[hereinafter Schwartz, Institutional Size]; Schwartz, "Jus-
tice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1078-79 (1979).
17. Curran, Antitrust and the Rule of Reason: A Critical Assessment, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J.
745 (1984).
18. Flynn, Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social
Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182, 1184-87 (1977); Flynn, "Reaganomics"
and Antitrust Enforcement: A Jurisprudential Critique, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 269, 302 [here-
inafter, Flynn, Reaganomics].
19. See generally Brodley, Massive Industrial Size, Classical Economics, and the Search
for Humanistic Value, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1155 (1972).
20. See Panel Discussion: Merger Enforcement and Practice, supra note 1, at 238.
21. Id. at 239.
22. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else
Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1192-94 (1977).
[Vol. 30:787
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substantially increase their market power, defined as the "ability
of one or more firms profitably to maintain prices above competi-
tive levels for a significant period of time."23 According to the ac-
companying memorandum, the amendment stated that section 7 is
directed against mergers that threaten to increase consumer
prices2 4 Division of opinion over the proposed amendment paral-
lels the dispute over the underlying goals of the current section 7;
and approval of the amendment depends on the extent to which
social and political goals in antitrust law are important.
The choice of enforcement strategies comes before policy makers
at a critical time. The average annual number of acquisitions in
the first six years of the Reagan administration was twice that of
the four years of the Carter administration. 5 At the same time, the
enforcement record of the Justice Department reflected a decrease
in the percentage of reported premerger transactions that resulted
in enforcement actions.28 In this political climate, an appreciation
of the alternative policy options is particularly important.
23. Merger Modernization Act of 1986, H.R. 4247, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(d) (1986).
Evidence of the increase in ability to exercise market power includes:
economic factors relevant to the effect of the acquisition in the affected mar-
kets, including (i) the number and size distribution of firms and the effect of
the acquisition thereon; (ii) ease or difficulty of entry by foreign or domestic
firms; (iii) the ability of smaller firms in the market to increase production in
response to an attempt to exercise market power; (iv) the nature of the prod-
uct and terms of sale; (v) conduct of firms in the market; (vi) efficiencies de-
riving from the acquisition; and (vii) any other evidence indicating whether
the acquisition will or will not substantially increase the ability, unilaterally or
collectively, to exercise market power.
Id. See also Justice Department Merger Guidelines, 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1169, at S-1, S-6 to S-8 (June 14, 1984) [hereinafter Justice Guidelines].
24. Test of Administration's Proposals on Antitrust Reform, 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1253, at S-9 (Feb. 20, 1986).
25. Over 2800 acquisitions per year occurred between 1981 and 1986, compared to an
average under 1400 per year for the years 1976-1980. The yearly total also increased steadily
during the period, rising from 2326 acquisitions in 1981 to 4022 in 1986. House Judiciary
Committee's Charts on Federal Antitrust Enforcement, Value of Corporate Acquisitions
(1976-1986), 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1305, at 451 (Mar. 5, 1987).
26. The percentage dropped from 1.15% in 1979 to .29% in 1986. House Judiciary Com-
mittee's Charts on Federal Antitrust Enforcement, Federal Merger Enforcement (1979-
1986), supra note 25, at 452. The percentage was obtained by dividing the number of en-
forcement actions by the Department of Justice in 1979 (10) and 1986 (7), by the number of
premerger transactions reported in 1979 (868) and 1986 (2406).
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B. Antitrust and Empiricism
The inspiration for the tremendous reliance on economics and
efficiency criteria for antitrust law policy in general and merger law
policy in particular has come from two, not necessarily related,
sources: empirical social sciences and the ascendancy of the free
market school of economics. Often citing the empirical research of
industrial organization economists, the Supreme Court in the post-
Warren period slighted political and social concerns with an in-
creasing focus on the market and its characteristics. This led to an
explicitly efficiency based enforcement program in the merger area
in the Reagan years.2 7 Empirical descriptions of the effects of mar-
ket concentration on prices (or profits) provided a basis for a pol-
icy that focuses on market structure. The lack of empirical evi-
dence of the relationship between mergers and the rise of
undesirable social and political events may not have caused the
lack of concern for nonefficiency goals, but the absence of an em-
pirical foundation may inhibit the advocates of nonefficiency goals
or diminish their persuasiveness. Free market economists believe
that these goals are unclear and imprecise and that their introduc-
tion into analysis would introduce "inconvenience," "lack of pre-
dictability," and "general mess" compared to purely economic
analysis.28
To explore the possibility of adding substantive content to these
nonefficiency goals, this Article will focus on the formulation of hy-
potheses that relate merger law policies to measurable social and
political consequences flowing from those policies as well as on hy-
potheses that relate structural characteristics of industries to social
and political phenomena. 29 This Article will show that much can be
learned simply by asking the proper questions, or, alternatively, by
asking the questions properly.
To incorporate social and political goals into merger law policy
in a rigorous and systematic fashion it is first necessary to separate
27. The merger enforcement guidelines the Justice Department issued reflect this focus.
See Justice Guidelines, supra note 23.
28. Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (1979).
29. The focus on hypothesis formation rather than testing not only establishes whatever
research agenda is possible for these goals, but saves the author the criticism and cavils of
pettifogging number crunchers.
[Vol. 30:787
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efficiency and nonefficiency considerations. To identify that subset
of policy concerns about which hypotheses will be formed, this Ar-
ticle begins in Part II by distinguishing efficiency from nonef-
ficiency goals. In Part III, the legislative, judicial, and scholarly
sources of the nonefficiency goals are examined to assess what the
proponents of various social and political policies intended to
achieve by their interpretations of the Clayton Act. Relying on
these sources, Part III attempts to classify and interpret these
nonefficiency goals in a way that will make them amenable to the
process of hypothesis formation without altering the substance of
the goals their proponents developed.
In Part IV, the lessons of the previous sections are applied to a
reformulation of merger law policy through a broader interpreta-
tion of the meaning of economic efficiency. The current interpreta-
tion is shown to be narrower than is required even by the neoclas-
sical economic framework within which the proponents of current
antitrust policy operate.
II. EFFICIENCY AND NONEFFICIENCY GOALS CONTRASTED
A. Introduction
To distinguish between the current narrow or "neo-classical"
view of efficiency and the broader view of efficiency to be devel-
oped in this Article, a distinction is drawn between what are re-
ferred to currently as efficiency goals and what will be categorized
as nonefficiency goals. Although it is tempting to label these two
categories "economic" and "noneconomic" goals, those labels are
less useful than the ones proposed because there is substantial eco-
nomic content even in the social and political goals. Professor
Pitofsky, for instance, discussing noneconomic concerns that
should be disregarded in antitrust law, includes
(1) protection for small businessmen against the rigors of com-
petition, (2) special rights for franchisees and other distributors
to continuing access to a supplier's products or services regard-
less of the efficiency of their distribution operation and the will
of the supplier (a kind of civil rights statute for distributors),
and (3) income redistribution to achieve social goals.30
30. Pitofsky, supra note 28, at 1058.
19891
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The confluence of economic, social, and political goals embodied in
these concerns suggests the need to find another term to capture
the subset of economic goals the Reagan administration pursued.
Efficiency goals of concern to the Reagan administration in in-
terpreting the antitrust laws related to the prices at which goods
are sold, the cost at which goods are produced, and the quantity of
goods produced. For the purposes of this Article, nonefficiency
goals include all other concerns embodied in a multivalued ap-
proach to antitrust. This is a precise but most restrictive definition
of efficiency. 31 In Parts B and C of this section, two conceptual
categories of relevance to antitrust law, productive efficiency and
allocative efficiency, are considered. After the boundaries of what
are currently understood to be the efficiency goals have been de-
fined, Parts III and IV contrast the other goals.
B. Productive Efficiency
When referring to the internal operation of a business firm,
economists often speak in terms of productive efficiency, which is
one way of measuring the performance of a firm. The content of
this term in economic theory is not always clear,32 but a useful gen-
eral interpretation is that an organization is productively efficient
if it gets the best possible results from its efforts.33 As applied to
the firm, the relevant interpretation for antitrust purposes is the
31. See R BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 91 (1978). By contrast, Robert Bork has identi-
fied efficiency with a broader notion of consumer welfare that includes all the things that
are understood to be desirable about competition as that word is used in everyday speech,
such as "low prices, innovation, choice among differing products-all things we think of as
being good for consumers." Id. at 61. This broader approach to efficiency is discussed in
Part IV. Because the focus of antitrust laws outside the Clayton Act is on anticompetitive
acts other than mergers, it will be useful to explore the implications of market power ob-
tained through merger for the ability of firms to engage in anticompetitive acts other than
raising prices and decreasing output. The FTC has focused on such anticompetitive behav-
ior. According to Jeffrey Zuckerman, Director of the Bureau of Competition, "[biased on
anecdotal evidence, there are enormous amounts of nonprice predation." Efforts to Reform
Antitrust Law Will Come From Different Directions, 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1297, at 45 (Jan. 8, 1987).
32. See Hall & Winsten, The Ambiguous Notion of Efficiency, 69 EcON. J. 71 (1959).
33. This definition is suggested in D. WATSON, PRICE THEORY AND ITS USES 178-79 (2d ed.
1968). See also R. FARE, S. GROSSKOPF, & C. LOVELL, THE MEASUREMENT OF EFFICIENCY OF
PRODUCTION (1985) ("[Elfficiency is the quality or degree of producing a set of desired ef-
fects." Id. at 1-2.).
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NONEFFICIENCY GOALS
supply of goods at least cost. 4 The Justice Department Guidelines
adopt this definition, stating that "[t]he primary benefit of merg-
ers to the economy is their efficiency-enhancing potential,"35 and
enumerating examples of efficiencies that the Department recog-
nizes as relevant evidence. These examples of how a firm might
lower its costs include "achieving economies of scale, better inte-
gration of production facilities, plant specialization, lower trans-
portation costs, and similar efficiencies relating to specific manu-
facturing, servicing, or distribution operations of the merging firms
* . . [as well as] reductions in general selling, administrative, and
overhead expenses. '3 6 This discussion illustrates the meaning and
role of productive efficiency in merger cases and why it is an ap-
pealing criterion from both a normative and empirical point of
view.
Although the Supreme Court specifically identified productive
efficiencies as a justification for ancillary restraints of trade under
the Sherman Act's rule of reason,37 their status is less certain in
merger cases. The early cases either rejected productive efficiency
arguments as a defense3" or regarded the existence of cost advan-
34. In microeconomic theory, this quality of a firm's production process has been alterna-
tively described as "economic efficiency." See, e.g., R ARMEY, PRICE THEORY. A POLICY-WEL-
FARE APPROACH 198 (1977); R. LEFTWICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 22
(7th ed. 1979). That term suffers the same defect as the term "economic" in describing one
set of concerns in merger law policy; it is insufficiently precise to distinguish between pro-
ductive and allocative efficiency. See infra text accompanying notes 47-59 for a discussion of
allocative efficiency and other types of efficiency.
35. Justice Guidelines, supra note 23, at S-8.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977) ("Verti-
cal restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve
certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products. These 'redeeming virtues' are implicit
in every decision sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule of reason."). See also
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.)
(group boycott, Sherman Act section 1 case) ("Because we find that Atlas' policy is designed
to make the van line more efficient rather than to decrease the output of its services and
raise rates, we affirm [the District Court's granting of summary judgment for Atlas]"), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325,
1338 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.) (Sherman Act sections 1 and 2, market power analysis
in denial of injunction) ("The antitrust laws protect efficient production for the benefit of
consumers.").
38. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) ("Congress was aware that
some mergers which lessen competition may result in economies but it struck the balance in
favor of protecting competition."); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,
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tages resulting from a merger as evidence of a probable and imper-
missible restraint on competition.39 More recent commentary, how-
ever, has suggested that the courts are becoming more receptive to
productive efficiency defenses in merger cases.40 In Christian
Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co.,4 the Sixth Cir-
cuit pointed out that the increased productive efficiency by merg-
ing firms that harmed competition was not the type of antitrust
injury remedied by an injunction to prevent a merger.42 The poli-
371 (1963) ("We are clear, however, that a merger the effect of which 'may be substantially
to lessen competition' is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or eco-
nomic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial.... Congress determined to preserve
our traditionally competitive economy. It therefore proscribed anticompetitive mergers, the
benign and the malignant alike, fully aware, we must assume, that some price might have to
be paid."); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) ("Congress appreci-
ated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of frag-
mented industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of de-
centralization."). See also R. BORK, supra note 31, at 204-05.
39. See In re Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1084 (1962) ("The resultant disparity
in size and type of operations permits the large conglomerate to strike down its smaller
rivals with relatively little effort or loss in over-all profit.").
40. See Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699,
729 (1977).
41. 753 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir. 1985).
42. Id. at 1357. In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1986),
the plaintiff claimed that the merger of two of its competitors would allow the competition
to sell at a lower price due to increased multiplant efficiencies. The Supreme Court held
that this represented only increased competition, not the type of antitrust injury necessary
to support a private claim for injunctive relief. In his concurrence in Procter & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S. at 597-98, Justice Harlan also recognized the relationship between increased pro-
ductive efficiency and increased competition:
If it is conceded, as it must be, that Congress had reasons for favoring competi-
tion, then more efficient operation must have been among them. It is of course
true that a firm's ability to achieve economies enhances its competitive posi-
tion, but adverse effects on competitors must be distinguished from adverse
effects on competition. Economies achieved by one firm may stimulate match-
ing innovation by others, the very essence of competition. They always allow
the total output to be delivered to the consumer with an expenditure of fewer
resources. Thus when the case against a conglomerate or product-extension
merger rests on a market-structure demonstration that the likelihood of an-
ticompetitive consequences has been substantially increased, the responsible
agency should then move on to examine and weigh possible efficiencies arising
from the merger in order to determine whether, on balance, competition has
been substantially lessened. Where detriments to competition are apt to be
"highly speculative" it seems wisest to conclude that "possibilities of adverse
effects on competitive behavior are worth worrying about only when the
merger does not involve substantial economies . . . ." The Court must proceed
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cies of the Reagan administration also indicated greater acceptance
of the productive efficiency defense. For horizontal mergers, the
Justice Department may permit some mergers that it might have
otherwise challenged if they are "reasonably necessary to achieve
significant net efficiencies."'4 3
From a normative viewpoint, the productive efficiency goal is ap-
pealing because it has societal implications that are independent of
the goals of the producer, or more generally, the organization at-
tempting to accomplish a particular result.44 The notion of produc-
tive efficiency, unlike some other economic concepts,4 5 does not in-
clude any implications about who gets the good once it is produced
or whether the good has any value. The notion refers only to the
method by which the good is produced. It may be considered non-
controversial because using the smallest quantity of scarce re-
sources to produce a product necessarily results in more left over
for the production of other things. 46
From an empirical viewpoint, the productive efficiency criterion
is appealing because it clearly specifies cause, effect, and a con-
necting theory. The desired effect of merging is the reduction of
production cost, an effect that is at least theoretically and often
practically measurable. The merging itself does not result in cost
with caution in this area lest its decision "over the long run deter new market
entry and tend to stifle the very competition it seeks to foster."
Id. (Harlan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
43. Justice Guidelines, supra note 23, at S-8.
44. R. FARE, S. GROSSKOPF & C. LOVELL, supra note 33, at 4. "The notions of technical and
structural efficiency are independent of the behavioral goal postulated for the producer.
That is, a producer is either technically and structurally efficient or inefficient, regardless of
the producer's behavioral goal." Id.
45. Id. "However, the notion of allocative efficiency is clearly goal-related, in the sense
that different goals generate different allocative efficiency requirements." Id. For discussion
of allocative efficiency, see Part II.C.
46. On the other hand, it might be argued that productive efficiency is not always desira-
ble. One of the inputs to the production of goods and services is labor and one might plausi-
bly argue that it is better to use more workers than fewer; it results, for instance, in the
retention of workers and thereby minimizes human dislocation even though a lower cost,
perhaps more technologically advanced or capital intensive, method of production is availa-
ble. See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 543 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). In addition, some would like to have the power to decide which goods have
value and which do not and would conclude that producing a valueless product, even by the
least cost means, is undesirable. For a product thought. by some to be harmful, production
at high costs would require a high price that would presumably discourage consumption.
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savings, but the reorganization of the production process might.
The explanation for how cost savings result from reorganization
has been the subject of extensive economic research. Policy makers
are thus satisfied that there is some connection between reality
and the alleged relationship between mergers and productive
efficiency.
C. Allocative Efficiency
Productive efficiency, as applied in the antitrust context, refers
to the way in which a producer of goods or services fashions, mar-
kets, and distributes its product. Allocative efficiency, however, is
concerned with the way in which a society's resources are allocated
among alternative production and consumption uses. An allocation
system is considered allocatively efficient if resources are employed
in their highest valued use as measured by the buyers' willingness
to pay for those resources.47 Because allocation of resources among
consumers and producers in a market economy is dictated by the
value these parties place on alternative uses for those resources,
allocative efficiency questions inevitably involve a determination of
the appropriate price at which each product is to be sold.4" Be-
cause the price influences the quantity of each product that will be
purchased, allocative efficiency also involves an examination of the
appropriate output level for each product.4 As with productive ef-
47. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 9, 11-15 (3d ed. 1986).
48. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND MARKET PERFORMANCE 13-14 (2d
ed. 1980).
49. Id. The technical economic requirements for allocative efficiency are translated into
practice in antitrust policy by focusing on the price and output effects of decisions by indi-
viduals and by firms. For a useful discussion of the underlying theory of individual choice
and the theoretical equivalencies that underlie the requirements, see, in order of increasing
technical complexity, M. SPENCER, CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 478-81 (2d ed. 1974); E.
BROWNING & J. BROWNING, MICROECONoMIc THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 514-25 (1983); and L.
FRIEDMAN, MICROECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS 382-88 (1984).
One may look at this pricing criterion as the solution to a societal cost/benefit problem. At
a price equal to the marginal cost of production, the price paid by the rational buyer is not
greater than the benefit derived from the purchase of the good. At a higher price, the cost to
some purchasers of acquiring the product may be greater than the associated benefit. By
restricting output and charging a higher price, the producer will gain profits above the re-
turn necessary to keep him in business, but the costs of production of another unit, being
lower than the price being charged, would, from a societal viewpoint, justify the production
and sale of another unit of output. Some buyers would benefit from this production, but the
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ficiency, the clear specification of cause and effect and the exis-
tence of an accepted explanation for why some mergers lead to al-
locative inefficiencies provide an appealing foundation for policy
makers who prefer to have an empirical basis for decision
making.50
sales cannot occur without a reduction in price. At a price below the cost of producing an
additional unit, the marginal cost, there will be no justification for the production of an
additional unit because at that level the benefit to society, as measured by buyers' willing-
ness to pay for another unit, is less than the societal cost of production. Only at a price
equal to marginal cost will the additional benefit and additional cost to society of producing
another unit be equalized; thus the appropriate price and appropriate level of output are
determined. (For a discussion of allocative efficiency with this cost/benefit flavor, see R.
BORK, supra note 31, at 100-01. Bork's discussion of allocative efficiency in the antitrust
context, id. at 91-104, is much more complete than this Article and is useful as a reference
to an exposition of allocative efficiency by one who believes that efficiency concerns are the
only relevant antitrust concerns.)
The system is allocatively inefficient at a price greater than marginal cost because the
wrong goods are being produced; alternatively, goods are being produced in the incorrect
proportion, because buyers are being forced, by prices greater than marginal cost in some
market(s), to buy products to which they assign less value. Resources are being allocated to
production that is not justified from a cost/benefit point of view. The size of the resources
pie to be shared by those in an economy is determined not only by the quantity of items
produced but also by the value placed on those items. Pricing each product at a level equal
to average total cost and marginal cost gives the largest total pie to be shared.
Some economists dispute that an allocatively efficient economy gives the largest pie.
Briefly, their argument is that a certain amount of market power, and hence price greater
than average total cost, is necessary to finance technological developments that will spur
more rapid growth of the economy and, consequently, a bigger pie. See, e.g., J. GALBRAITH,
AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER (1952); J. SCHUMPETER, CAP-
ITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1954). For a general discussion, see J. KOCH, INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION AND PRICES 214-16 (1974).
50. The price at which a product is sold raises both equity and allocative efficiency con-
siderations, which must be distinguished in order to separate efficiency and nonefficiency
goals. The equity consideration in pricing is related to a preference for a particular income
distribution; the allocative efficiency consideration is closely tied to the output level of each
product produced. The distributional consideration involves a choice of who receives how
much wealth. If other things are equal, the seller receives more wealth if it sells the product
at a high price than at a low price. When the price charged to buyers is equal to the average
total cost of producing the product, the producer does not make more than a normal profit.
See, e.g., F. SCHERER, supra note 48, at 14. The normal economic profit is considered by
economists to be a part of the cost of production. See, e.g., J. KOCH, supra note 49, at 17; P.
SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 457 (6th ed. 1964). Normal economic profit is defined as the profit
sufficient to keep the seller in business. See, e.g., W. SHEPHERD. MARKET POWER AND Eco-
NOMIC WELFARE 26 (1970). Average total cost is therefore the total cost, including normal
economic profit, of producing a given number of units divided by the number of units pro-
duced. See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON, supra, at 457. Because there is no surplus return to capital,
investors earn a return just sufficient to encourage them to continue to engage in the enter-
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Concern with the power of a firm over the price of its product
has been explicitly recognized in antitrust law for decades,5 partic-
ularly in its connection with monopoly and market power: "Mo-
nopoly is a protean threat to fair prices.... Perhaps no single fact
manifests the power and will to monopolize more than price con-
trol of the article monopolized."5' 2 The Supreme Court recognized
the distributional implications of the price level and its relation-
ship to competition in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.5 3 In that case,
Chief Justice Burger stated: "It is in the sound commercial inter-
ests of the retail purchasers of goods and services to obtain the
lowest price possible within the framework of our competitive pri-
vate enterprise system. The essence of the antitrust laws is to en-
sure fair price competition in an open market."'54 The federal cir-
cuit courts first made the connection between the price and
marginal cost equality and allocative efficiency in cases involving
regulated industries.5 The Supreme Court applied this approach
in finding a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act in a collec-
tive refusal by dentists to cooperate with insurers' requests for X-
prise in question. Id. This result is thought to be desirable in terms of income distribution.
Id. This distributional preference, although a recognized concern of merger law, is distin-
guishable from a preference for allocative efficiency. See infra Part IV.
51. See, e.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797
(1945). The purpose of the Sherman Act "was to protect consumers from monopoly prices."
Id. at 806 (discussing Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940)).
52. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 309 (1947).
53. 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
54. Id. at 342.
55. The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals in Standard Oil Co. v. FERC, 612 F.2d
1291 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979) described the key to economic efficiency and minimizing
economic distortions as:
a free market economy ... [where] buyers and sellers through the forces of
demand and supply find the equilibrium price where demand equals supply. At
that point the economy operates most efficiently .... It is at this price that
resources will best be allocated. As Samuelson states: "The final competitive
equilibrium is an 'efficient' one. Because prices equal marginal costs, output is
being maximized, inputs are being minimized; .... From so efficient a final
point, you can no longer make everyone better off. You can help (A) only by
hurting (B).
Id. at 1296 (citations omitted). In National Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. United
States, 607 F.2d 392, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980), the court,
discussing marginal cost pricing theory, stated that "[t]raditional economic theory concludes
that a price set at marginal cost achieves the optimum equalization of the current cost to
society of employing scarce resources and the value to consumers of using those resources."
1989] NONEFFICIENCY GOALS
rays, identifying social welfare with the ability of the market to
provide consumers with prices equal to marginal cost.56
As the Seventh Circuit recognized, the terminology of allocative
efficiency is becoming more prevalent in the circuit courts in the
antitrust context: "The allocative-efficiency or consumer-welfare
concept of competition dominates current thinking, judicial and
academic, in the antitrust field. '57 Price and output considerations
are also becoming the focus of Supreme Court antitrust opinions
such as NCAA v. Board of Regents. s From an empirical perspec-
tive, the cause of enhanced prices or decreased out-
put-quantifiable bad effects-is the exercise of market power,
which is measured by a variety of tests, some in themselves empiri-
cally based.59 The explanation for why and under what circum-
stances market power leads to enhanced prices is provided by gen-
erally accepted microeconomic principles. Again the empirical
approach provides some rational basis for policy making.
56. FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). Comparing the dentists' ac-
tions with price fixing, the Court held:
A refusal to compete with respect to the package of services offered to custom-
ers [the forwarding of x-rays to insurance companies along with claim forms],
no less than a refusal to compete with respect to the price term of an agree-
ment, impairs the ability of the market to advance social welfare by ensuring
the provision of desired goods and services to consumers at a price approxi-
mating the marginal cost of providing them. Absent some countervailing
procompetitive virtue-such as, for example, the creation of efficiencies in the
operation of a market or the provision of goods and services.... such an agree-
ment limiting consumer choice by impeding the "ordinary give and take of the
market place," . . . cannot be sustained under the Rule of Reason.
Id. at 459 (citations omitted).
57. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States, 704 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1983) (Pos-
ner, J.).
58. 468 U.S. 85, 106-08 (1984):
The anticompetitive consequences of this arrangement are apparent ...
Price is higher and output lower than they would otherwise be, and both are
unresponsive to consumer preference .... A restraint that has the effect of
reducing the importance of consumer preference in setting price and output is
not consistent with this fundamental goal of antitrust law. Restrictions on
price and output are the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade that the
Sherman Act was intended to prohibit.
59. Market power is often inferred from market concentration, see F. SCHERER, supra
note 48, at 56, or from the relative ability of firms to raise price above marginal cost, see J.
KOCH, supra note 49, at 161-72.
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III. NONEFFICIENCY GOALS: THEIR ROOTS AND CONTENT
A. Introduction
This section discusses a number of social and political goals of
antitrust. Part B discusses the process of hypothesis formation, to
establish the criteria by which the nonefficiency goals are to be
evaluated; the following parts examine the various goals. Part C
explores the goal of preservation of political freedoms-from Jef-
ferson's vision of agrarian democracy through nineteenth-century
fears of rebellion and anarchy, to twentieth-century concern with
communism, National Socialism, and overzealous regulation. Part
D describes quality of life issues, from the values of community
and citizenship to the protection of nonentrepreneurial freedoms,
emphasizing the advantages of locally owned businesses and the
dangers to community values of excessive corporate discretionary
power. Part D identifies characteristics of a "good society" and dis-
tinguishes them from other nonefficiency values that one might
promote through the antitrust laws. Many of these characteristics
fall under the categories of political freedoms, but others describe
a cultural ambiance allegedly lost through overconcentration of ec-
onomic wealth and power. Part E describes the goal of protecting
entrepreneurial freedom-the opportunity for individuals to em-
bark upon entrepreneurial endeavors, and the desirability of pre-
serving a place in the market for small firms. These sections will
draw on a sample of authorities large enough to give broad repre-
sentation to all expressions of sentiment that purport to give sub-
stantive content to the goals relating to the protection of citizens
as participants in a democracy, as residents of communities, and as
would-be entrepreneurs.
B. Hypothesis Formation
The purpose of this Article is to explore whether nonefficiency
goals are too unknowable and too undefinable to be appropriate
values for merger law enforcement policy. The criterion for the de-
termination is a quasi-empirical one: whether the goals can be
stated in a way that will make them susceptible to empirical analy-
sis. The benefit of such an approach is that it may translate an
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analytical approach that Judge Bork referred to as "poetry"' into
a more rigorous and systematic framework. Empirical analysis
would enable enforcers or policy makers to evaluate systematically
the relationships between the structure of markets and conduct of
firms on the one hand and undesirable social and political conse-
quences on the other. Hypothesis formation and testing aids in
evaluating the likely effect of any particular policy option or en-
forcement emphasis and highlights the consequences of neglecting
to reflect a particular set of values in an enforcement strategy or in
the interpretation of a statute.
A proper empirical approach requires an underlying theory that
describes how failure to prevent identifiable mergers and acquisi-
tions will lead to identifiable undesirable consequences. Such an
approach also requires rigorous identification of the classes of un-
desirable mergers and acquisitions and the detrimental effects and
a prediction of a relationship between the two. The neoclassical
economic approach provides this theoretical explanation by exam-
ining the incentives competitive forces create and the likely reac-
tions of economic actors who, guided by the desire to maximize
profits, respond in predictable ways. Because competitive forces
change in systematic ways as a market becomes more concen-
trated, the theory suggests, incentives are created under specified
conditions that encourage or allow economic actors to raise prices
above cost. Merger law enforcers, then, must identify when firms
obtain sufficient power in the market to influence price. Because
the focus of this approach is on the economic actors' price and out-
put determinations and on their cost-cutting behavior, the natural
tendency is to focus on the productive and allocative efficiency
consequences of responses to market stimulae. Theories of cause
and effect thus lead to the statement of hypotheses that form the
foundations for enforcement policy. 1
60. Professor Walter Adams, supporting a proposal to eliminate the requirement of proof
of anticompetitive conduct when monopoly power occurs in the relevant market, argued
that the rule would serve to diversify social and political power. Robert Bork replied that
this argument was "more poetry than analysis." "No-Fault" Monopolization Proposal De-
bated by Presidential Commission on Antitrust Reform, [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 880, at A-22 (Sept. 14, 1978).
61. In response to criticism that the underlying assumptions of neoclassical explanation
are unrealistic, some economists argue that the predictive power of the theory gives validity
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The empirical approach requires a statement of the hypothe-
sized relationship between specified events and/or consequences.
Economists, for instance, hypothesize a positive relationship be-
tween a firm's market share and the firm's ability to charge prices
that are higher than marginal cost. Two identifiable and measura-
ble events are specified and the relationship between them is de-
scribed. In this example, a theory, based on a set of assumptions
about the motivations of economic actors, describes how actors will
respond to the acquisition of the power to influence prices in the
market. Empirical work, moreover, supports the conclusion that as
the market becomes more concentrated, the difference between
price and marginal cost increases.6 2 The main body of this Article
to the explanation. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Es-
SAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3 (1953). This argument suggests a second approach to hypoth-
esis formation. If a relationship between identifiable acquisitions and identifiable social and
political outcomes exists, it might be possible to test whether this relationship actually oc-
curs in our society without having a theoretical explanation for why the relationship exists
or how an acquisition causes or contributes to a particular result. If the relationship is em-
pirically verifiable, then there is a basis for designing a policy, once it is agreed that the
outcome is to be avoided and that avoiding this outcome does not lead to other undesirable
consequences; that is, that the costs are not too high.
Two dangers to this latter approach should make one cautious even if they do not deter
one from using it. The first is that empirical examination of the relationship between two
observable events does not mean that there is any causal connection between them. A third
variable may influence both events. A study of the coincidence in Norway of the high birth
rate of human beings in certain years and the frequency of stork sightings during those
years is cited frequently. See, e.g., D. BARNES & J. CONLEY, STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN LITIGA-
TION: METHODOLOGY, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE 379 (1986). A policy of killing storks might
be thought, on the basis of the empirical evidence, to be a means of preventing the "deliv-
ery" of so many babies. Demographers, however, pondering the empirical evidence, noted a
third variable, severity of the winter, that apparently influenced both events. The severe
winters led to people spending more time at home with fires in their fireplaces. This unusual
propinquity, the demographers theorized, gave rise to increased birth rates, while the
warmth of the chimneys-due to constant fires-enhanced the birthing prospects for storks,
who routinely build their nests around chimneys. Id. Similarly, there might be no causal
relationship at all between two phenomena even though an empirical relationship exists.
One court, in the process of examining empirical evidence in a discrimination case, observed
that Manhattan has had no forest fires since the Forest Service started putting up Smokey
the Bear posters. Louis v. Pennsylvania Indus. Dev. Auth., 371 F. Supp. 877, 885 n.14 (E.D.
Pa. 1974). Insisting on a theoretical foundation for a hypothesis helps prevent erroneous or
misleading conclusions based on empirical testing.
62. See, e.g., N. COLLINS & L. PRESTON, CONCENTRATION AND PRICE-COST MARGINS IN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1968); Collins & Preston, Concentration and Price-Cost Mar-
gins in Food Manufacturing Industries, 14 J. OF INDUS. ECON. 226 (1966); Collins & Preston,
Price-Cost Margins and Industry Structure, 51 REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS 271 (1969). As
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explores the extent to which similar hypotheses can be formed
about social and political values and their relationship to mergers
and acquisitions.
One unavoidable step in hypothesis formation is a statement
about the direction and nature of the causal relationship. Section 7
of the Clayton Act presents the opportunity to control firm, mar-
ket and industry structure, and size as well as the behavior of
firms. By manipulating these variables, alternative social and polit-
ical, as well as efficiency, objectives can be achieved. By their na-
ture, these control points are theoretically the explanatory vari-
ables, in the sense that they are thought to "explain" or
"influence" the social and political characteristics of our society.
Inappropriate size, structure, or behavior is said to cause undesir-
able social and political effects and the social and political charac-
ter of the country is said to "depend" on the size, structure, and
behavior of firms, markets, and industries; hence the dependent
variables are those identifiable and specific consequences of
changes in the explanatory variables. The following sections ex-
plore the extent to which rigorous statements or hypotheses can be
formed regarding the explanatory variables subject to control
under the Clayton Act and the dependent variables identified as
nonefficiency goals.
C. Protection of Citizens' Political Rights
Thomas Jefferson's vision of society is a historical foundation for
the fear of the political power of large economic units. To extrapo-
late from Jefferson's writings to the ultimate judgment against cor-
porate power, however, takes a combination of two strains of his
work. From his theory of government, the societal vision called for
James Koch points out, this may be an example of a third variable simultaneously influenc-
ing the two variables being studied. J. KOCH, supra note 49, at 191. In a study by Koch and
Fenili, concentration was not a significant predictor of price-cost margins when other fac-
tors, such as the rate of technological change and product differentiation, were taken into
account. Koch & Fenili, The Influence of Industry Market Structure Upon Industry Price-
Cost Margins, 18 RMSTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE E COMMERCIALI 1037
(1971). But many other studies support the underlying hypothesis that industrial concentra-
tion is positively correlated to high profit and price. For a survey of the empirical literature
on this point and the associated methodological criticisms, see F. SCHERER, supra note 48, at
267-95 and cited references.
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the wide dispersion of political power; 3 from his views on the no-
bility of "cultivators of the earth," one finds a generalized distaste
for manufacturing and business.64 His obvious distaste for manu-
facturers, "pander[ers] of vice," is not merely class bias but part of
a political theory predicting that corporate power will lead to dis-
satisfaction among the people and ultimately to rebellion and
revolution. 5 In Jefferson's view, the power of large organization
oppresses the people; thus, in both the economic and governmental
spheres, small units with dispersed power centers are preferable.
At this historical stage, of course, how the existence of corporate
power results in rebellion is unspecified; the mechanism is not
worked out. The fear of permitting men of business to acquire
"kingly" power by amassing economic power, however, lay at the
foundation of the Sherman Act, passed in 1890. Senator Sherman's
remarks indicate: "If the concentered powers of this combination
are intrusted to a single man, it is a kingly prerogative, inconsis-
63. See Letter to Samuel Kercheval from Thomas Jefferson (July 12, 1816), printed in 15
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 38 (A.E. Bergh ed. 1907):
[I]n government, as well as in every other business of life, it is by division and
subdivision of duties alone, that all matters, great and small, can be managed
to perfection. And the whole is cemented by giving to every citizen, personally,
a part in the administration of the public affairs.
See also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816), printed in THE LIFE
AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 660-61 (A. Koch & W. Peden ed. 1944):
What has destroyed liberty and the rights of man in every government which
has existed under the sun? The generalizing and concentrating of all cares and
powers into one body, no matter whether of the autocrats of Russia or France,
or of the aristocrats of a Venetian senate.
64. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay (Aug. 23, 1785), printed in 8 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 426 (J. Boyd ed. 1973):
Cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens. They are the most vig-
orous, the most independent, the most virtuous, and they are tied to their
country, and wedded to its liberty and interests, by the most lasting bonds....
I consider the class of artificers [i.e., manufacturers) as the panders of vice and
the instruments by which the liberties of a country are generally overturned.
65. Id. This theory is evident from Jefferson's comments on the political turmoil in
France:
Nor should we wonder at this pressure [for a fixed constitution in France],
when we consider the monstrous abuses of power under which this people were
ground to powder; when we pass in review the weight of their taxes, and...
the shackles on commerce by monopolies; on industry by guilds and
corporations.
THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 63, at 88-89 (emphasis
added).
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tent with our form of government, and should be subject to the
strong resistance of the State and national authorities.""6
This general fear of concentrated aggregations of capital carried
over to the legislative history of the Clayton Act, when, in 1914, it
was raised in the merger context.17 In this legislative history, two
mechanisms were implicit in fears that the economic power of cor-
porations might destroy democratic institutions: (1) rebellion or
revolution by the masses and (2) the self-defensive adoption of col-
lectivist or socialist policies by a government threatened by corpo-
rate usurpation. Reference to the potential of social and political
power to cause rebellion or "social disruption" 8 was quite possibly
a reaction to labor and "anarchist" and farm unrest during this
historical period.69 These references suggest a fear, reminiscent of
Jefferson's view of the French Revolution, of popular (or populist)
uprising in the streets against corporate power. Others, who hy-
pothesized that popular sentiment against large corporations
would lead to a democratically elected socialist government, per-
ceived a more peaceful, but no more acceptable, socialistic alterna-
tive mechanism. 0
66. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1889) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
67. See HousE COMMITTEE REPORT ACCOMPANYING PROPOSED CLAYTON AcT, HR. REP. No.
627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914): "The concentration of wealth, money, and property in
the United States under the control and in the hands of a few individuals or great corpora-
tions has grown to such an enormous extent that unless checked it will ultimately threaten
the perpetuity of our institutions." See also 51 CONG. REC. 9086 (1914) (statement of Rep.
Kelly):
Enterprises with great capital have deliberately sought not only industrial
domination but political supremacy as well .... Great combinations of capital
for many years have flaunted their power in the face of the citizenship, they
have forced their corrupt way into politics and government, they have dictated
the making of laws or scorned the laws they did not like, they have prevented
the free and just administration of law. In doing this they have become a men-
ace to free institutions and must be dealt with in patriotic spirit without fear
or favor.
68. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 129 (1982) (citing 51 CONG. REC.
9186 (1914) (statement of Rep. Helvering) and 51 CONG. REC. 14,536 (1914) (statement of
Sen. Cummins)).
69. 51 CONG. REC. 9167 (1914) (statement of Rep. Nelson). See T. BROOKS, ToM AND
TROUBLE 38-71 (1971). For a summary of the historical context of the antitrust statutes, see
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 10-13 (1977).
70. 51 CONG. REc. 9167 (1914) (statement of Rep. Nelson):
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After World War II, when Congress amended the Clayton Act,
the fear of emergent socialism was replaced by a fear of commu-
nism on the one hand, and totalitarianism patterned after National
Socialism on the other. Elaborating on Representative Nelson's
view that the public would never allow great concentrations of eco-
nomic power to rest in private hands,1 one scenario was based im-
plicitly on a Marxist theoretical perspective. Marxist theory had
based its projection of the demise of capitalism on the "prediction
that concentration of wealth and power would be carried so far in
capitalist countries as to deprive most people of protection from
monopoly and to leave them without interest in the survival of pri-
vate enterprise. '72 Alternatively, a danger to democracy in America
was presented by the German, Italian, and Japanese experiences
during the 1930s when industrial monopolies seized the govern-
ment, inserted leaders such as Hitler, and forced the world into
war. 3 The legislative history clearly reflects Congress' concerns
that, when power is entrusted to the hands of a few, "either sociali-
zation or a totalitarian form of government has taken over. '74
These concerns are stated, however, without specifying, even as
clearly as Karl Marx had done, the mechanism of transfer of con-
trol.7 5 Professor Schwartz identifies the reason for imposing anti-
trust laws on Germany and Japan after World War II as a desire to
create alternative and diffuse centers of power that could not be
marshalled behind authoritarian regimes.76 Professor Pitofsky is as
As surely and rapidly as the properties of all the people pass into the hands of
a few trust magnates, public sentiment, rapidly forming, when once fully
aroused, will multiply the socialistic vote as a protest against monopoly privi-
lege. And the day when the people must choose between public ownership of
trusts for the benefit of all and the private ownership of the trusts for the
privilege of the few, will witness the final triumph of socialism in this country.
71. Id. See also 95 CONG. REC. 11,494 (1949) (statement of Rep. Yates).
72. See 95 CONG. REc. 11,486 (1949) (statement of Rep. Celler).
73. See Merger Standards under U.S. Antitrust Laws, ABA Monograph No. 7, at 24
(1981). Representative Celler quoted from a report from the Secretary of War who identified
the rise of industrial monopolies and their increasing control of Germany with the rise of
Hitler and the initiation of World War II. 95 CONG. REC. 11,486, 11,494 (1949) (statements of
Rep. Celler and Rep. Yates); see also Pitofsky, supra note 28, at 1062-63.
74. 96 CONG. REc. 16,503-04 (1950) (statement of Sen. Aiken).
75. See generally K. MARx, CAPITAL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CAPITALIST PRODUCTION (F.
Engels ed., S. Moore & E. Aveling trans., 3d German ed. 1895).
76. Schwartz, The Mind of a Liberal Law Professor: Selections from the Writings of
Louis B. Schwartz, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 847, 869 (1983).
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specific as anyone about the mechanism for a totalitarian coup
when he describes a scenario in which, during a period of domestic
stress or disorder, corporations, in some unspecified manner, "fa-
cilitate the overthrow of democratic institutions and the installa-
tion of a totalitarian regime.''77
This survey reveals a variety of views of the political implica-
tions of corporate power, including (1) rebellion or revolution lead-
ing in unknown directions, (2) state ownership of the means of pro-
duction (by means of socialism, communism, or some other kind of
collectivism), or (3) what might, for the sake of contrast, be re-
ferred to as corporate control of the means of governance (in a to-
talitarian, National Socialist mold). Naturally, these extreme fore-
casts are modified in less dramatic implications of the excessive
economic power of corporations. Short of collectivism, one may
fear excessive regulation of corporate activity, often described as a
"command economy," in which the government exercises consider-
able power in the market. 8 Short of totalitarianism, one may fear
domination of political life by corporate interests. The modern
literature emphasizes these same two strains-excessive govern-
ment regulation of corporate activity and excessive corporate influ-
ence in governmental activity-having less concern with the rebel-
lious nature of the American citizenry.
1. Excessive corporate political influence
Corporate political power may be a reflection of power in a par-
ticular market or a result of accumulation of wealth generally,
without reference to market concentration. Focusing on concern
with market power, Professor Pitofsky argues that although it may
be impossible to prove that high levels of concentration in markets
are incompatible with democratic institutions, it seems unlikely,
given what theories of cartel behavior say about cooperative behav-
ior, that a trade association of small firms in an industry would
have as much political clout as a single firm of comparable size.79
Professor Elzinga notes that small enterprises without trade as-
sociations, located in only a single congressional district are in an
77. Pitofsky, supra note 28, at 1054.
78. See, e.g., M. SPENCER, supra note 49, at 36, 675.
79. Pitofsky, supra note 28, at 1055.
1989]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
even worse political position."0 Allowing markets to become con-
centrated, then, has political implications as well as efficiency im-
plications. From these perspectives, the key variables for political
power are large market share within a product market and the
ability to extend political influence throughout the Nation.
Other commentators suggest that conglomerate corporations, be-
cause they draw power from a variety of markets, have a particu-
larly great ability to make an effective presentation of their case
for favorable government treatment and can mobilize support for
their position from a wider range of sources."' Elzinga suggests
that an enterprise acquired by a conglomerate suddenly has more
political access because frequently, conglomerates restructure the
legal representation of formerly independent firms so that they ac-
quire increased representation in Washington, D.C.8 2 He raises
these points in the context of the ability of firms with political
power to gain economic advantage over smaller rivals rather than
political power for its own sake. The analysis, however, is sugges-
tive of how political power is acquired and used. Professor Cann
suggests that the very variety of agencies with which a conglomer-
ate will deal permits some sort of economy of scale to arise, not
because of the assortment of repeated dealings with a single agency
but because of dealings with many agencies.8 3
Others fear the accumulation of economic wealth generally. Pro-
fessor Schwartz fears that the concentration of wealth will domi-
nate the government through control of the press, educational in-
stitutions, politics, and the legal system. 4 Professors Carstensen
80. Elzinga, supra note 22, at 1197.
81. Carstensen & Questal, The Use of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to
Attack Large Conglomerate Mergers, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 863 (1978) (citing Blake,
Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 555, 591 (1973)).
82. Elzinga, supra note 22, at 1197-98. Elzinga cites the example of the conglomerate ac-
quisition of O.M. Scott grass seed company by ITT as a restructuring that is likely to make
the federal government far more approachable than it was before: "Scott may be more likely
to use this new position to gain favors regarding taxes, import competition, government
contracts, and other amenities." Id. at 1198.
83. Cann, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Pursuit of Economic "Objectivity": Is
There Any Role for Social and Political Values in Merger Policy?, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
273, 310 (1985).
84. Schwartz, supra note 76, at 867:
The centers of great wealth will own and influence newspapers, magazines and
broadcasters, direct the development of universities, retain the ablest lawyers,
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and Questal refer, without being specific, to disclosures of unlawful
corporate contributions as "forceful reminders of the risks to an
open political system that concentrations of economic wealth cre-
ate."85 These examples describe the dangers to democratic
processes from large accumulations of wealth rather than from
market power in a particular market. A systematic approach to an-
alyzing the problems of excessive corporate influence must identify
one of two different sources of influences, high concentration in a
market or wealthy corporations, perhaps conglomerates, to accu-
rately describe the correlations and connections between corporate
power and the purported demise of democracy.
Three different theories regarding the influence of corporate in-
terests on governmental decision making emerge: excessive corpo-
rate political power arises from excessive concentration in a partic-
ular market, or from conglomerate organization, or from large
aggregations of wealth. Each separately, and perhaps in combina-
tion with the others, can be subjected to hypothesis formulation.
2. Excessive governmental regulation of corporations
The fear of excessive regulation is a logical descendant of the
fear of socialism. Arguments along regulatory lines suggest that if a
single firm dominated all markets, this firm would undoubtedly
have to report its activities in detail to the government. The firm
also would be the constant subject for governmental oversight and
investigation, and eventually would come under direct governmen-
tal control.86 Legislative history also suggests a similar process by
which big business begets big unions and a correspondingly. big
government arises to keep them all in line. 7
Professor Brodley identifies intolerance of the discretionary au-
thority corporations exercise on the local level as triggering pres-
economists and public relations specialists, finance political parties, infiltrate
or wear down the executive agencies by which they are supposed to be regu-
lated, and operate powerful lobbies so that the popular will itself is shaped to
their needs.
85. Carstensen & Questal, supra note 81, at 863.
86. See Pitofsky, supra note 28, at 1057.
87. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1949); 96 CONG. REc. 16,452
(1950) (statement of Sen. Kefauver). This theory of countervailing powers is also seen in the
economics literature. See, e.g., J. GALBRAITH, supra note 49, at 121-23.
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sure for excessive regulation.8" The social consequences of the
choices of a single firm with market power or great wealth may
give rise to pressure for pervasive regulation ranging from restric-
tive state takeover legislation to far greater intrusions. For exam-
ple, legislation might require a periodic review of corporate char-
ters and require that corporate governing boards become directly
representative of, or even elected by, the various constituencies af-
fected by corporate behavior: employees, consumers, suppliers, lo-
cal communities, regions and even the Nation as a whole. This vi-
sion is not too far removed from some current regulatory areas.
Corporate decisions having "social impact" might become subject
to governmental review. 9
The connection of excessive regulation to merger law is made ex-
plicit through Professors Blake's and Jones's interpretation of the
underlying purposes of the antitrust laws and the prohibition of
mergers as a regulatory measure: "The overriding purpose of anti-
trust policy ... is to maintain an economy capable of functioning
effectively without creating an abundance of supervisory political
machinery." 90 Prohibiting a merger can avoid the necessity for a
regulatory apparatus for each of the many problems associated
with large firms, and minimize the intrusion of government into
economic affairs. The concern Blake and Jones articulated is not
limited to the evolution of state ownership but also to "informal
governmental supervision-through congressional investigations,
government-industry consultations, and executive pressure."9' 1 Pro-
fessor Schwartz notes that regulation will not curb corporate politi-
cal power satisfactorily because regulatory decision making will be
88. Brodley, Limiting Conglomerate Mergers: The Need for Legislation, 40 OHIO ST. L.J.
867, 873 (1979).
89. Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 383 & n.24 (1965)
(referring to President Kennedy's intervention in the steel price increase in 1962). Although
he acknowledges the possibility that concentration in particular markets might eventually
lead to such pervasive regulation, Pitofsky views the American economy as being far from
this level of concentration today. He cites a lack of increase in concentration among the top
200 firms and the probable decentralization of most markets due to increased foreign com-
petition and decreased transportation costs (which increase ease of entry). Pitofsky, supra
note 28, at 1058.
90. Blake & Jones, supra note 89, at 383.
91. Id.
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dominated by corporate interests.92 This conclusion suggests that
an antitrust solution is a more preferable mechanism of control of
corporate power than regulation, while assuming implicitly that
pro-corporate interests will not dominate the antitrust enforce-
ment process. 3
Assuming, for the sake of developing the issue of the appropriate
form of regulation, that there is a relationship between firm size,
either relative or absolute, and the undesirable characteristics (the
subject of the remainder of this Article), the question is whether
antitrust law is the preferred form of regulation. This question has
at least two parts: (1) whether merger law is less intrusive than
other forms of regulation and (2) whether merger law, applied ap-
propriately, can reduce the pressure for regulation of big firms.
The intrusiveness of merger law will depend, of course, on the
complexity of the criteria by which the legality of a proposed
merger is to be judged. It is hard to imagine a more straightfor-
ward approach than that embodied in those bills that proposed to
outlaw mergers of companies resulting in a merged firm greater
than a specified size. Yet even the most well-known of these pro-
posals allowed as an affirmative defense that "(1) the transaction
will have the preponderant effect of substantially enhancing com-
petition; [and] (2) the transaction will result in substantial efficien-
cies. ' '9 4 This approach amounts to a failure to simplify the process
compared to the strict economic efficiency approach; it transfers
the burden of proof from the government, who would, under the
present section 7, have to show that the merger may substantially
lessen competition, to the acquiring firm, which must justify the
transaction. Such legislation, of course, presumes a myriad of un-
desirable consequences associated with size without considering
them or investigating them specifically, and shifts the burden to
the acquiring firm to demonstrate that those consequences are out-
weighed. Although the Justice Department's approach may result
92. Schwartz, supra note 76, at 868.
93. See also Brodley, supra note 88, at 876 (suggesting that merger law may be a less
onerous alternative to other forms of regulation).
94. Small and Independent Business Protection Act of 1979, S. 600, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
125 CONG. REc. 12,792, § 3(a)(1)-(2) (1979). Senator Kennedy's Act prohibited, inter alia,
acquisitions that would lead one corporation to acquire another if each firm had assets or
sales exceeding two billion dollars. Id. § 2(a).
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in undesirable political and social effects of mergers, the "simple"
prohibition discourages experimentation with different forms of
ownership and control and interferes with what the Reagan Justice
Department described as the "important role [of mergers] in a free
enterprise economy"-to "penalize ineffective management and fa-
cilitate the efficient flow of investment capital and the redeploy-
ment of existing productive assets." 5
A second, relatively straightforward, approach was embodied in
a proposed new section to the Clayton Act. The section would re-
quire any corporation that, as a result of an acquisition, had total
assets and annual net sales (the sum of the two figures, divided by
two) exceeding two billion dollars, to file an extensive "plan of di-
vestiture" with the FTC and Justice Department." The reporting
and approval requirements of the proposal hardly constitute mini-
mal intrusion into the structuring of the economy. Yet the propos-
als must be compared to the potential intrusiveness of hypotheti-
cal responses to public pressure to reduce the discretionary
political, economic, and social power of large corporations.
This analysis suggests two conclusions. The first is that the argu-
ment for prevention of overregulation by government rests on the
same logical foundations as the other nonefficiency goals; it will be
sensible to respond to perceived ills through merger law only if
there is a correlation between the variables subject to control
under antitrust law, such as market concentration or corporate
size, and those undesirable social, economic, and political events.",
The second is that even with such a correspondence, merger law
may not be a perfect substitute for other forms of regulation. As
with any proper analysis of regulatory alternatives, the costs of
each alternative must be considered, along with its limitations.
95. Justice Guidelines, supra note 23, at S-1.
96. See Dougherty, Concentration, Conglomeration, and Economic Democracy: A 'Con-
current Divestiture' Proposal, 11 ANTITRUST L. AND ECON. REV. 29, 43 (1979) (proposed
Clayton Act section 7B(a)(2)).
97. One may plausibly argue that even if there is no connection in reality, there may be a
public perception of a connection that will lead to pressure for government regulation. This
argument suggests that even if there is no correlation, merger law will serve the will of the
people by prohibiting those corporate charateristics that make the people uneasy. My ra-
tionalist bias makes it difficult to accept such an argument even though I present an argu-
ment for a more democratic interpretation of the concept of efficiency. See infra Part IV.
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3. Incorporating concern for political freedoms into merger law
enforcement
The corporate threat to political freedom may be usefully di-
vided into two perspectives: a cataclysmic view, which predicts
overthrow of the government by social unrest or corporate coup
with substitution of a socialist, communist, national socialist, or
other totalitarian regime, and a view that predicts a more subtle,
incremental shift in the locus of power between the governmental
and corporate sectors. Under either view, the explanatory vari-
ables, or some subset of them, cause, or are identified with, corpo-
rate political influence or government regulation that is by some
measure excessive. Identification of the dynamics of the expected
result affects the statement of the hypothesis. At some point the
absolute wealth of corporations may become so immense that no
legislator can afford to vote in any manner contrary to the dictated
wishes of the corporations (a cataclysmic view), or alternatively,
that as the wealth of corporations increases we expect legislatures
to favor corporate interests (an incremental view). Applying the
hypothesis formation process to these views indicates that some of
them are hopelessly vague, that some may be unripe for implemen-
tation in antitrust enforcement although susceptible to clear artic-
ulation, and that others are potential avenues for modification of
current enforcement policy.
a. Cataclysmic models of political harms
The cataclysmic political events, the dependent variables in our
analysis, include the ascendancy of autocrats or aristocrats, social
revolution and unrest, socialism, communism, or national social-
ism. The causes, or explanatory variables, are variously identified
as "[t]he generalizing and concentrating all cares and powers into
one body,""8 "the shackles on commerce by monopolies; on indus-
try by guilds and corporations,"' 9 the amassing of economic power
and the entrusting of the concerted power of a huge combination
to a single man,100 "the concentration of wealth, money and prop-
98. THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 63, at 660-61.
99. Id. at 88-89.
100. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
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erty in the U.S. under the control and in the hands of a few indi-
viduals or great corporations,"1"1 "enterprises with great capital"
or "great combinations of capital,"1 2 the passing of "the properties
of all the people . . . into the hands of a few trust magnates,' 0 3
great concentrations of economic power in private hands, 04 and
"concentration of wealth and power. ' 1 0 5 All but one of these prof-
fered explanatory variables involves the accumulation of wealth
and property and the power over goods and people that accompa-
nies wealth. The accumulation of wealth presumably leads to polit-
ical power both because there is enough wealth in an absolute
sense that the possessor can afford to spend some on political in-
fluence, and because the possessor has relatively more wealth than
others who desire to influence the political process. Commentators
speak of "concentrated wealth" in both its absolute and relative
senses. This dependent variable, concentrated wealth, is a charac-
teristic of an economic system quite distinct from market share or
concentration within a market, which is clearly the focus of current
merger law enforcement.106
Market share, by contrast, is a purely relative characteristic,
comparing one firm's proportion of total sales or output, for in-
stance, to those of the others in the market. Various concentration
indices measure the dispersion of sales across firms within a mar-
ket and do not imply command over economic or political re-
sources outside the market. These market-specific variables, sug-
gested by Jefferson's concern for the detrimental effects of
monopolies, guilds, and corporations, are measures of structural
characteristics of a market that are predicted to lead to the dimi-
nution of the freedom of citizens that will "[grind] them to
powder."' 17
101. H.R. REP. No. 627, supra note 67.
102. 51 CONG. REC. 9086 (1914) (statement of Rep. Kelly).
103. 51 CONG. REc. 9167 (1914) (statement of Rep. Nelson).
104. See 95 CONG. REc. 11,486 (1949) (statement of Rep. Celler).
105. 95 CONG. REC. 11,494 (1949) (statement of Rep. Yates).
106. See supra Part I.A.
107. See THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 63, at 88.
To the extent that the diminished freedoms are political freedoms, the discussion of hypoth-
esis formation in this section is relevant. The empirical treatment of other "freedoms" is
treated in the following sections.
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Relying on these catastrophic visions for hypothesis formation
suggests discrete alternatives for dependent variables, such as the
advent of communism, anarchist revolution, or national socialism.
One might predict, for instance, that the concentrated wealth of
corporations will lead to communism, national socialism, or anar-
chy even though none of these events has occurred, The task is
then to identify key characteristics of these alternative forms of
government or to define what is meant by social unrest so that epi-
sodes or events can be identified for purposes of comparison. Be-
cause the predicted results of increasing corporate wealth or mar-
ket concentration are inconsistent with one another, have little
theoretical foundation, and have not materialized in this country,
however, a serious problem arises even prior to consideration of the
ability to define the phenomena predicted. If one identifies social-
ism or communism by a key characteristic of state ownership of
the means of production and national socialism as corporate domi-
nation of governmental processes (in the German or Italian models
of the thirties), then conflicting hypotheses might predict that the
increasingly concentrated wealth of corporations will lead to in-
creasing government control of business or the opposite, increasing
corporate control of government. Stating the possible hypotheses
in this way indicates the fundamental underlying problem with
these cataclysmic predictions; with very little, if any, theory behind
the predictions, one has no reason to favor one over the other and
the hypotheses suggest merely that as corporate wealth increases,
something will happen. Inevitably over the years the relationship
between government and business will change because of changes
in a variety of other variables such as tax policy, environmental
policy, foreign policy, and macroeconomic policy that may be due
to exogenous forces other than the changes in corporate wealth.
The lack of an underlying theory prevents us from analyzing the
validity of the assumptions that describe motivations behind the
changes in the corporate government relationship and from segre-
gating the influence of exogenous variables or even determining
whether they are, in fact, exogenous. The evidence supporting the
hypotheses is thus likely to be anecdotal and subject to infinitely
varying interpretations.
The lack of theory, the conflicting nature of underlying predic-
tions, and the lack of evidence that any of the hypothesized
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changes in governmental form have materialized make it difficult
to incorporate these cataclysmic theories into merger law policy. A
crucial difficulty lies in the inability to identify systematically spe-
cific mergers that are likely to have detrimental effects. Proposals
to prevent all mergers that would result in a firm greater than a
specified size seem to offer a rather broad gauge approach when
one has no way of estimating how big is too big for purposes of
political stability or identifying whether the key control variable is
the size of an individual firm, the size relative to other potential
political actors, or the size of the industry as a whole. Even if one
ignores concentrated wealth and focuses on market concentration,
it is hard to state systematically how power to affect market price
is related to changes in forms of governments; even if one assumes
there is a relationship, it is unclear whether the same market share
that gives rise to pricing power also gives rise to political upheaval.
Although hypotheses may be advanced about the relationships
between economic variables such as concentration of wealth and
market share or concentration and broad political variables, an a
priori notion of the effect of relevant economic variables on cata-
clysmic political changes is necessary. This stuff fairly qualifies as
mush.'08
b. Incremental models of political harms
Emphasizing excessive government regulation of corporate activ-
ity and excessive corporate influence in governmental activity,
modern commentators have focused on two strains of analysis that
modify the dramatic predictions of cataclysmic collapse of our po-
litical system. An incremental approach to this concern considers
the relationship among three explanatory variables-market con-
centration, concentration of wealth, and the conglomerate form of
organization-and two dependent variables-the levels of corpo-
rate political influence and government regulation of corporate ac-
tivity. Excessive governmental regulation of corporate activity is
relevant to merger law to the extent that mergers produce particu-
lar effects in our society. Accordingly, the relationship between
mergers and undesirable social effects is explored in separate dis-
108. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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cussions devoted to those identifiable effects. This section dis-
cusses corporate political influence.
The theories of excessive corporate influence rely on several dif-
ferent approaches to sources of political power. The most straight-
forward is that associated with Professor Schwartz, 09 who suggests
that the great wealth of corporations, presumably concentrated
wealth in both its relative and absolute senses, will permit them to
finance politicians and engage in massive lobbying efforts favoring
corporate interests. This problem is compounded by the existence
of conglomerate corporations whose growth is unlikely to be
checked by an enforcement strategy focusing on market concentra-
tion. A second, distinguishable, approach is derived from commen-
tators such as Professors Pitofsky"0 and Elzinga,"' who suggest
that single firms gain more political clout per dollar than do trade
associations with an equivalent budget for acquiring political influ-
ence. This argument rests on the greater efficiency of a monopolist,
a single management attempting to influence government policy,
relative to a cartel with its potentially divergent interests and po-
tential for destructive self-serving behavior. This is a market con-
centration analysis rather than a wealth concentration argument
because it focuses on the detrimental effect of increasing the mar-
ket share of a single firm so that it has single managerial control
over the manner in which the political influence funds available in
an industry are spent.
The first approach suggests that as the resources available to a
firm or to the corporate sector increase, both absolutely and rela-
tively in comparison to political opponents, the political climate
increasingly will favor that firm's interests or corporate interests
generally. A parallel hypothesis is that the political climate will be-
come more favorable to corporate interests as the wealth of the
corporate sector increases. Pursuing this market theory of democ-
racy requires, as all proper tests of hypotheses do, a precise state-
ment of the explanatory and dependent variables. The explanatory
variable, amount of wealth, appears to be easier to quantify than
the dependent variable, amount of political influence, if one is will-
109. See Schwartz, supra note 76.
110. See Pitofsky, supra note 28.
111. See Elzinga, supra note 22.
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ing to accept the dollar value of the firm's available resources as an
absolute indicator of power to affect a political decision. However,
not all of a corporation's assets are available for lobbying, so the
proper measure is discretionary wealth-assets available for expen-
diture in this fashion-not a readily available figure.
As the logic underlying the hypothesis suggests, difficulties mul-
tiply if one employs a bargaining model of political influence be-
cause some measure of the relative ability of opponents to buy
favorable political outcomes would be necessary. This latter mea-
sure presents great difficulties. Assuming a number of available
measures of the discretionary corporate wealth of a firm of any
given type, it is unclear how much is available to their opponents
or, for that matter, who their opponents are. One can probably
measure the corporate wealth of a tobacco firm, for instance, in an
attempt to estimate its influence over legislation banning cigarette
advertising, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure the
wealth of those who seek or would benefit from the ban. Who are
the opponents of tobacco advertising whose relative wealth is to be
compared? And should the corporate wealth of advertising agen-
cies be included on the side of the tobacco company, simply be-
cause they share an interest in promoting the health of a client
industry?
In addition to the difficulties in properly defining and measuring
the values of the explanatory variables in this wealth concentration
approach, it is difficult to measure the impact of corporate expend-
itures. Measuring the effect of expenditures on politicians and lob-
bying presents two alternative approaches, which might be charac-
terized as output and input measures of political influence. Using
an output measure, for instance, assume that as the wealth of the
Fortune 500 firms increases (relative to that of noncorporate inter-
ests, however measured), the win/loss ratio for corporate interests
in legislation improves. This hypothesis would require an examina-
tion of individual pieces of legislation to see whose interests are
favored; and it is often difficult to tell whether corporate or
noncorporate interests benefit from a particular piece of legisla-
tion. Broader measures of political success, such as the correspon-
dence between increases in corporate size and a simultaneous shift
to the right in politics generally, are fraught with other difficulties
involving the influence of other, exogenous variables.
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To avoid the difficulties involved in measuring the ability to in-
fluence political events, input measures may be employed. The use
of input measures assumes that outcomes, in terms of political in-
fluence, will be proportionate to the effort (or money) expended in
attempting to influence the outcome. One might, for instance, mea-
sure how the relative proportion of total contributions made to
politicians by corporations changes over the years as the relative
and absolute wealth of corporations changes. Alternatively, one
might compare changes in the relative numbers of lobbyists (or
dollars spent on lobbying) by corporate and noncorporate groups
as the concentration of wealth changes. Because these input mea-
sures involve somewhat fewer subjective judgments and available
data, a number of studies have attempted to test hypotheses in-
volving the relationship between concentration of wealth in the
hands of corporations and the relative expenditures on political in-
terests. 112 One general problem with input measures is that they do
not clearly reflect success in lobbying." 3 It would be consistent
with a finding of increased relative corporate expenditures to con-
clude that, over time, corporations needed to increase expenditures
just to maintain the political power they had at one time.
Political power of conglomerate corporations is thought to arise
from their economic constituencies in many political districts and
the fact that they do business with so many different parts of the
government bureaucracy. Professor Blake argues that an invest-
ment in goodwill is more valuable to the conglomerate firm be-
cause it is spread over more types of deals made by the various
divisions of the company, suggesting that large investments in lob-
bying or political goodwill can be amortized over a larger number
of possible payoffs.114 This goodwill may affect either purchasing
decisions by the government or the political process. If the ability
of the conglomerate firm to affect political outcomes is due to its
large size, then the hypotheses relating corporate size to political
112. See, e.g., Siegfried, The Effects of Conglomerate Mergers on Political Democracy: A
Survey, in THE CONGLOMERATE CORPORATION 45 (D. Blair & R. Lanzillotti eds. 1980).
113. This same problem arises in studies of whether large or small firms are more success-
ful innovators. Funds expended on research and development do not necessarily translate
into success at an equal rate for different types of firms. For a review of the literature on
this subject, see F. SCHERER, supra note 48, at 413-15, 418-22.
114. Blake, supra note 81, at 591.
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power discussed above apply; the success in obtaining favorable
political treatment will be due to the same factors for any firm,
conglomerate or not, with equivalent resources. The difficulties in
proof will also be the same. If the conglomerate form is something
special, then it'may be either that a conglomerate corporation has
subsidiaries scattered throughout the country, thereby gaining lev-
erage with politicians throughout the country, or that it deals with
such a variety of governmental agencies that it gains political lev-
erage. Either explanation may plausibly account for increased po-
litical power for conglomerate corporations and offer interesting
explanatory variables for empirical research. The possibilities for
hypothesis formation and the associated difficulties with hypothe-
sis testing, such as the difficulty of measuring success in political
persuasion or in drawing inferences from input measures, are quite
similar to the problems of measuring the effects of size generally.
Many of the same arguments apply to hypotheses involving mar-
ket concentration as an explanatory variable, although with this
variable new problems arise. The argument is that increased corpo-
rate political power arises from an economy composed of concen-
trated industries or that a corporation with a large market share
will be in a better position to seek government favors. One under-
lying explanation is that increased prices due to the market power
of a firm in a concentrated industry mean greater profits, some of
which might be spent discretionarily on political outcomes." 5 An
alternative argument, referred to above, 1 6 is that a single firm can
more efficiently arrive at and support a given political position
compared even to a collection of small firms with the same amount
of money to spend. An economy composed of concentrated indus-
tries, then, will have more political representation from the corpo-
rate perspective per dollar spent even if the concentrated corporate
sector of the economy does not make higher profits. The hypothe-
ses presented to test these theories ideally would compare two
economies, a concentrated and an atomistic one, with all other con-
ditions equal. Alternatively, one could compare the United States
115. The empirical literature on the relationship between concentration rates and prices
and profits provides evidence in support of the suggestion of increased profitability in con-
centrated industries. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, supra note 48, at 276-85.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
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economy at times when the relative level of corporate wealth was
constant but the relative concentration of American industry was
different. A more sophisticated multivariate time series analysis
might separate out the relative influences of various explanatory
variables on the efficiency of political expenditures.
Yet another alternative approach would be to study the compar-
ative political effectiveness of two similar industries with different
degrees of concentration, to test the single firm/trade association
proposition directly. With this approach comes the difficulty of
finding industries that are similar, or, perhaps more basically, of
determining on what dimensions the industries must be similar to
provide a controlled test. At a minimum the industries must have
the same kinds of political concerns. This approach might also
mean that the industries must produce the same kinds of products
so that they present the same safety risks potentially subject to
regulation, or have the same kinds of production processes so that
they present the same sort of environmental, health, and occupa-
tional safety concerns to the regulators. Inevitably the measures
will be complicated by the fact that the products or production
processes or market constraints (such as demand in the natural
monopoly industries) of some industries may generate greater pub-
lic interest and scrutiny and, hence, governmental interference.
This factor is difficult to quantify; nevertheless, a number of em-
pirical studies of these phenomena have been attempted.117
Although the measuring instruments are at best imprecise, the
hypotheses are relatively clear, at least in part because the basic
assumption of the theory of how the results are achieved is implic-
itly understood-increased wealth buys political results by contrib-
uting enough to elect favorable politicians or to put persuasive
force behind a particular administrative or legislative position. The
question of what enforcement policy one would adopt once the re-
lationship between corporate wealth and favorable political out-
comes were understood remains. Presumably enforcers or policy
makers would have to decide in general how many resources corpo-
117. See C. LINDBLOOM, POLITICS AND MARKrS (1977); Pertschuck & Davidson, What's
Wrong with Conglomerate Mergers?, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1979); Salamon & Siegfried,
Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Pol-
icy, 71 AM. POL. SC. REv. 1026 (1977); Siegfried, supra note 112.
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rations should be allowed to spend or how to limit corporate con-
tributions to politicians. From a merger law perspective, this deci-
sion is difficult to make without prohibiting mergers of firms over a
certain size. It does seem reasonable to ask for some justification
for determining what the maximum size should be in relation to
the largest permissible size.
At the least, the hypotheses can be stated clearly and the issue
has been joined clearly. It is not enough for those advocating the
pure efficiency approach merely to assert that this is "'mush'"
and accordingly dismiss it."8 Serious problems clearly arise in de-
ciding what the appropriate level of political power is and whether
merger law is the appropriate vehicle for curbing political power.
This is an implementation issue, however, rather than an assertion
that either the goals or mechanisms are too vague to be appropri-
ate for antitrust enforcement." 9
D. Protection of Citizens' Quality of Life
1. Protection of communities
The Jeffersonian notion of the perfect society has also motivated
a concern for the preservation of small-business towns whose econ-
omies are characterized by diverse, small, locally owned enter-
118. See supra text accompanying note 1.
119. An even sneakier issue underlies the question of incorporating political concerns into
the enforcement process: how should we make policy under uncertainty, such as that result-
ing from contradictory or anecdotal empirical evidence? This question, of course, permeates
the problems of decision making generally, not just decision making in a democracy. The
resolution in a democracy will inevitably depend on the importance of the decision and the
political predelictions of the policy maker. The test proposed in this Article for whether a
goal is an appropriate candidate for consideration in antitrust enforcement is whether it can
be stated in a clear fashion; more precisely, whether one can propose a hypothesis relating
two variables, one a controllable explanatory variable, the other a policy objective. With
respect to these political goals, although one is unable at this stage to draw guidelines to
determine to what degree discretionary wealth or market concentration is threatening to
political freedoms, the failure to include these concerns in antitrust enforcement should be
based on the difficulty of implementation or disagreement with the proposition that corpo-
rate political power is bad rather than on the notion that the goals are too poetic or
"mushy" to be worthy of serious consideration. It is not enough to say that generalized
reactions against the political power of large corporations are merely "misguided populist
residue." Pertschuck & Davidson, supra note 117, at 6.
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prises.120 This concern is based, as were the political concerns, on
the view that decentralized power and decision making leads to an
improved quality of life for citizens and economic health for their
communities. Rather than being an attack on bigness per se, these
criticisms aim at mergers that result in domination of local eco-
nomic or social interests by outside forces, usually an external cor-
poration that acquires the local company. The fact that outside in-
terests control corporate decision making implicitly means that
local economic effects are given less weight. The result is that busi-
ness decisions may have severe local economic effects on local busi-
ness people who lose customers and clients, on workers who lose
employment, on municipalities and states that suffer tax losses,
and on the citizenry that depends on the services they provide.
A second concern is the loss of freedom due to the shift in con-
trol from local interests to outsiders. As he was fond of doing in
merger cases,12 Justice Douglas referred to Justice Brandeis'
"Curse of Bigness" in Standard Oil Co. v. United States'22 when
reminding the Court that, in addition to the price effects of acqui-
sitions of local firms by outside interests, a serious loss in citizen-
ship occurs: "Local leadership is diluted. He who was a leader in
the village becomes dependent on outsiders for his action and pol-
icy."' 23 Congressman Bryson also made the connection to merger
law, while indicating the real source of his.concern, regional differ-
ences between north and south, when he stated: "It is through
mergers.., that so many of the local southern communities have
come under the domination of big business-outside northern big
business.1 124 In addition to the effect of mergers on the redistribu-
120. See SMALL BUSINESS AND Cmc WELFARE, S. Doc. No. 135, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 92
CONG. REC. 1261 (1946), in which this terminology is used and the characteristics and stereo-
types of small-business towns are discussed.
121. See e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
122. 337 U.S. 293, 318 (1949) (Douglas, J., separate opinion).
123. Id. at 319.
124. 95 CONG. REc. 11,495 (1949) (statement of Rep. Bryson) (emphasis added). Congress-
man Bryson also stated:
Under local ownership, most of the income derived from the operation of the
mills remains in the communities in which the mills are located. It is plowed
back into those communities in the form of new investments in other factories,
shops, and enterprises of one type or another. In other words, under local man-
agement the legitimate profits of industry tend to remain at home and promote
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tion of wealth through the enhancement of prices, then, there is a
redistribution of control from local individuals to absentee
managers.
The shift in the locus of control is aggravated, as Professor Car-
stensen notes, by the differential in the level of concern of local
and outside management for the interests of the community. "Dis-
cretionary power" held by large, absentee corporations is defined
as "the 'range of managerial choice not dictated by or fully predict-
able from pure profit maximizing behavior.' "125 It is the power to
make decisions that adversely affect the lives of other people with-
out having to take into account the associated costs that permits
arbitrary decisions detrimental to the common good.126 For Justice
Douglas, the experience of a small town in his home state of Wash-
ington that was abandoned after an out-of-state corporation ac-
quired the major employer epitomized the difficulty. 121 "Central-
the well-being of the home town. In contrast, under the new outside ownership,
the profits are siphoned off to distant areas, which in the case of the textile
industry, usually happens to be New York City-a metropolis which of all
communities in the country is least in need of additional supplies of capital.
Id.
The anti-big city bias is apparent in the words that follow this part of Congressman
Bryson's speech:
Moreover, large portions of these profits which are drained off to these metro-
politan centers are not put to work in the form of new capital investment but
are used for such nonproductive purposes as speculation in the stock market,
buying useless luxuries, gambling at the race track, paying night-club bills, and
engaging in the other frivolities of the cosmopolitian idle rich.
Id.
He believed that greater reinvestment in the business sector under local ownership, and
greater investment in the community would result:
Under local ownership, there are strong social and civic ties that bind the com-
munity together. Under outside ownership, these ties are weakened and bro-
ken. Merchants and manufacturers do not get together in local organizations
for the obvious reason that the owners of the manufacturing firms live else-
where. Hence the drive for civic improvements of one kind or another generally
tends to disappear in towns which have become the victims of outside
ownership.
Id.
125. Carstensen & Questal, supra note 81, at 864 n.121 (quoting Brodley, Potential Com-
petition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L.J. 1, 35 (1977)).
126. See, e.g., Pertschuk, Jeffersonian Politics and Conglomerate Mergers: A 'Cap and
Spin-off' Approach, 11 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 19, 22 (1979) (discussing discretionary
power).
127. Falstaff Brewing, 410 U.S. 526, 543 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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ized decision makers, far removed from the areas affected by their
actions, may choose a course that substantially and needlessly dis-
rupts the lives of their employees and the stability of entire com-
munities."' 28 Focusing only on profit and loss to their corporations,
"men on the 54th floor" of their New York skyscrapers "decide the
fate of communities with which they have little or no
relationship.' 1 29
None of the concerns articulated above are efficiency concerns.
They are concerns for the economic or cultural survival of small
communities, for redistribution of control from local to outside
forces, or for other measures of quality of life from educational ex-
penditures to charitable contributions-nonprice effects of merg-
ers. Several sources, such as lack of economic diversity within a
community-domination by a single employer-and external con-
trol, give rise to a multiplicity of ills. A useful analysis would at-
tempt not only to identify cause and effect relationships but to dis-
cern which relationships are the result of mergers and which could
be incorporated into antitrust enforcement effectively.
These concerns fall into two analytical categories that are con-
sidered separately. The first are quantifiable measures of economic
and social well-being and include such factors as the level of capi-
tal investment in the community in which the income is generated,
the level of charitable corporate contributions to the community,
or the effects on tax revenues and employee dislocation due to cor-
porate relocations. The second category includes concern for the
loss of power or freedom to control one's destiny that accompanies
the increase in discretionary power by absentee managers. This
category is probably not quantifiable even though anecdotal evi-
dence may convince policy makers that it is the result of mergers.
Both can be incorporated into merger law policy usefully.
2. Protection of local interests through merger law enforcement
Discussions of objective measures of community well-being as-
sert that mergers cause specified undesirable consequences. Appar-
128. Carstensen & Questal, supra note 81, at 864. "For example, decisions to open, close,
alter, or move plants affect countless persons whose welfare may not have been considered
in the decision-making process." Id. at 864 n.122.
129. Falstaff Brewing, 410 U.S. at 542 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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ently those mergers that result in the shift of corporate control
away from the locality cause the undesirable results. Consider two
such objective measures, the reinvestment of locally generated
profits in the community and corporate charitable and civic contri-
butions, as illustrative of the analysis necessary to support an en-
forcement strategy that takes these concerns into account. One
may start with evidence that the locus of control often shifts away
from the community as a result of mergers. Professor Blumberg
reports that from 1949 to 1968, the 200 largest American corpora-
tions acquired 3,908 companies with assets of $50.2 billion. Of
these acquisitions, New York corporations gained a net transfer of
control of 986 companies involving $13.228 billion of assets previ-
ously headquartered in other states, thereby increasing the share
of assets of the largest 200 firms that were controlled from New
York from 36.5% to 45.8%.13° The next step is to demonstrate that
this increase in control results in a decline in the level of local rein-
vestment of profits derived from community activities and a de-
cline in local corporate charitable contributions. Both examples
present concerns that can be articulated rigorously and tested em-
pirically and that, if considered important from a policy perspec-
tive, must be balanced against efficiency concerns.
A variety of empirical approaches include a study of the rela-
tionship between locus of control and civic involvement. These ap-
proaches have examined corporate contributions to local charities.
Recognizing the relationship between increasing external control of
local enterprises and the general increase in size of firms,
Blumberg cites data showing that the larger the firm, the smaller
the percentage of net pre-tax income or sales contributed to char-
ity.131 Blumberg suggests that keeping corporations small would in-
crease the total dollar amount of charitable contributions.' 32 In ad-
dition, Professors McElroy and Siegfried, surveying firms in an
attempt to identify the beneficiaries of charitable contributions,
130. P. BLUMBERG, THE MEGACORPORATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 58 (1975).
131. Id. at 60 (citing COUNCIL FOR FINANCIAL AID TO EDUCATION 1972 CORPORATE SUPPORT
OF HIGHER EDUCATION (1972)).
132. McElroy and Siegfried suggest that the decline in contributions as size increases is
not as great as estimated by many investigators. See McElroy & Siegfried, The Effect of
Firm Size and Mergers on Corporate Philanthropy, in THE IMPACT OF THE MODERN CORPO-
RATION 99-138 (B. Bock ed. 1984).
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found that seventy percent of contributions by large firms are
made to the headquarter's city and that executives in the head-
quarter's city controlled ninety percent of funds expended on con-
tributions.133 This data would not be persuasive support for the
hypothesis if the headquarter's city contained proportionately
more of the firm's employees; but the study also found that chari-
table contributions per employee averaged $214 for the headquar-
ters' cities compared to $43 per employee in the cities in which
plants were located. 3 Whatever gains there may be to productive
efficiency, then, there are side effects on the distribution of wealth
and on small communities that policy makers might reasonably de-
sire to take into account. A similar tradeoff appears when one ex-
amines corporation charitable contributions. The cost of keeping
corporations at a particular size to generate a preferred pattern of
contributions may be the foregoing of productive efficiencies asso-
ciated with economies of scale. Again, a tradeoff between efficiency
and quality of life may occur.
The inference that acquisitions by large firms leads to changing
investment patterns also suggests that a tradeoff may exist be-
tween efficiency concerns and community welfare. Although a cor-
porate decision to favor a local investment over a more profitable
foreign investment may be contrary to shareholders' interests and
the societal interest in generating the largest economic pie of goods
133. Id. at 124.
134. Id. at 125. These analyses apply to all means by which a corporation gets big; no
distinction between internal expansion or merger has been made. Recognizing that the data
support but do not directly test the hypothesis as it relates to mergers, McElroy and Sieg-
fried investigate both the magnitude of changes in contributions and the characteristics of
the beneficiaries that might result from acquisitions. Their approach allows them to identify
particular cases in which an acquisition is likely to lead to a decrease in total contributions
and to a reallocation of contributions away from the old headquarter's city of the acquired
firm. They conclude that the change in level of total contributions will vary with the relative
rates of contributions out of profits in the acquiring and acquired firms. Other things equal,
because medium-sized firms have the highest rate of contributions, acquisitions of smaller
firms by medium firms will increase contributions; and acquisitions of medium firms by
large firms would decrease contributions. Id. at 132-33. McElroy and Siegfried find that the
distribution of contributions across locales apparently depends on the characteristics of the
headquarter's cities, among other factors; contributions to the headquarter's city decrease,
for instance, as the size of the headquarter's city increases and the contributions of other
firms in the headquarter's city increase. Id. at 126-29. This sort of analysis allows a case-by-
case analysis of the impact of a proposed merger on one quantifiable measurement of the
welfare of the community occupied by an acquired company.
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and services, it does serve local distributional preferences.'35 Bal-
ancing this allocative efficiency loss is a gain for the community in
terms of employment, wealth generation, and general corporate
concern for the prosperity of the community. A corporate decision
to forego profits to keep a community prosperous may represent a
quality of life choice rather than a profit-making choice. Analysis
of the tradeoff is hardly a simple matter because economic welfare
of one community occasionally is sacrificed for the economic devel-
opment of another. Acquisitions may lead to a redistribution of ec-
onomic opportunity.
Whether these relationships between size and contributions to
community or charity are valid, objectives that might be achieved
by merger law policy are different from the efficiency goals but are
not purely poetry or" 'pure intellectual mush.' ,,136 Straightforward
hypotheses can be presented for investigating the relationship be-
tween acquisitions and objective measures of community involve-
ment or between corporate size and objective measures. To the ex-
tent that these objectives are important, empirical investigation
comparable to that of the industrial organization economists is
needed.
Including concerns for community life in the enforcement pro-
cess clearly involves difficulties of measurement, political balancing
of interests, and projections and weighting of future events. These
difficulties, however, are not inherently different from the require-
ments imposed on enforcers by the current enforcement strategy
and their interpretation of the Clayton Act, which requires projec-
tions of the likelihood of allocative efficiency losses and productive
135. Consider the hypothesis that a shift from local to external control will lead to a
decrease in local capital investment. If the investment opportunities of local and distant
corporations are identical, transfer of control to an external firm might make no difference.
The profit-maximizing corporation would always seek the best opportunity wherever lo-
cated. On the other hand, what appears to be the best opportunity may depend on the
flexibility with which a corporation can oversee investments in distant geographic areas,
giving the national corporation an advantage in pursuing external alternatives. The national
corporation may also have better information about the availability of outside investments.
If this assumption is correct, one implication of keeping control in the local community is
that less profitable investment choices are made by those with earnings to reinvest. This
result means not only that available investment capital is not going to its most profitable,
that is, its highest valued use, which implies a loss of allocative efficiency, but corporate
profits are lower for the local firm than for the national firm.
136. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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efficiency gains as a result of the merger. The "mushiest" of the
balancing factors is the interference with freedom of contract and
the benefits of allowing the market to reallocate property from lo-
cal ownership to conglomerate ownership; yet these are treated as
advantages to merger although the quality of life characteristics
are considered too "poetic" to be considered at all. One might give
the same treatment to employment effects, and, at the least, these
quantitative measures of effect of a merger on a community are
substantive enough to be given weight if they are deemed signifi-
cant by the political process.
3. Protection of nonentrepreneurial freedoms
The antitrust laws have been variously described as a "charter of
liberty," a "charter of freedom," a "charter of economic liberty,"
and a "bulwark against arbitrary action and oppression at the
hands of the economically powerful.' 1 37 Although these phrases
suggest individual freedoms, freedom to control one's destiny, free-
dom in something other than the economic realm, most predicted
dire results fall into one of several categories: (1) impact on indus-
trial structure, conduct, or performance, (2) impact on political
freedom, (3) impact on entrepreneurial freedom, (4) impact on
wealth distribution, and (5) impact on individuals' feelings of
powerlessness. Although the above cited language often is taken to
imply something beyond freedom in the business realm, most of
the examples of the ways in which large firms impinge on individ-
ual liberty relate to maximum freedom of opportunity, freedom of
action, or the range of choices available to both consumers or pre-
sent and prospective businessmen.' s In fact, very little in the legal
137. Blake & Jones, supra note 89, at 384 & n.27.
138. The cures for these ills are the same as the remedies for excessive market
power-encouraging the formation of markets of numerous buyers and sellers, ease of entry,
protecting business interests. Id. at 384. Interference with freedom in the merger law con-
text usually relates to large firms' use of economic power to interfere with small firms' abil-
ity to choose which products to make, which technologies to use, where to sell, and how
much to sell. Pitofsky, supra note 28, at 1056. Some of these decisions obviously fall within
the province of the firm and are subject to market discipline if incorrect. Pitofsky, however,
offers the example of the oil company that buys out the coal companies in order to dictate
the terms of competition. Id. at 1057. This action by firms in markets closely related to their
own is described as an exercise of the discretionary authority of firms that are "relieved to
some extent from the unrelenting demands of a market model." Id. at 1056.
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literature addresses the freedoms of the citizen, qua citizen, as af-
fected by large firms.
Two catch phrases, one from the legislative history of the Clay-
ton Act and the other from case law, are usually offered as self-
proving assertions. The first is taken from a speech Congressman
Bennett of Florida gave just prior to the taking of the vote in the
House of Representatives amending section 7. He proclaimed that
the amendment was necessary because the "greatest value [of the
anti-monopoly laws] lies in protecting our citizenry from domina-
tion by business interests so large and monopolistic that the voices
of average people cannot be heard in their thunder."'' 9 This
speech does not suggest what this phrase means, wedged as it is
between anticommunist and anti-union rhetoric. Presumably it is
part of the concern either about loss of political power140 or with
the discretionary authority of big firms.
The most frequently cited relevant phrase from case law comes
from United States v. Aluminum Corp. of America,141 in which a
three-judge tribunal of senior circuit court judges, deciding a Su-
preme Court case from which a majority of the Justices had re-
cused themselves, alluded to the "helplessness of individuals"' 142
before large firms, again apparently referring to a loss of freedom
by citizens. The phrase in the case referred, without elaboration, to
two parts of the legislative history-one describing the powers of a
corporation as a "kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of
Numerous commentators take this approach to describe the loss of freedom due to discre-
tionary authority of the large corporation. These corporations have influence over a variety
of decisions: plant location, advertising strategy, product development, product safety, mar-
keting, the distribution of dividends. See, e.g., Cann, supra note 83, at 312; Sullivan, Anti-
trust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 11 (1980). Economic performance suffers from the secretive nature of big companies
who can afford to develop their own research and thereby refrain from sharing the scientific
knowledge with others who, in a competitive industry, would patent the invention in order
to prevent someone else from getting it first. Schwartz, Institutional Size, supra note 16, at
8-9. Similarly, monopolies in journalism tend to blunt the edge of criticism and big press
tend to be lax in their criticism of business. Id. at 9-13. These concerns relate to the indus-
try structure best designed to produce products desired by consumers and produce techno-
logical advances, one of a collection of "industrial" goals discussed in Part IV.
139. 95 CONG. REC. 11,506 (1949) (statement of Rep. Bennett).
140. See supra Part III.B.
141. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
142. Id. at 428.
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government"' 4 and the other suggesting that inequality of wealth
and opportunity was a major social concern. 44 These references
are to a speech by Senator Sherman introducing the Sherman Act
to the Senate in 1890. When referring to kingly prerogatives, Sher-
man was concerned only with the power of corporations over "the
production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of
life.' 1 45 Although others may draw noneconomic threats to individ-
ual liberty from this language, there is scant evidence that this was
Sherman's concern.'46 Any evidence that he was concerned with
noneconomic liberty derives from his reference to the inequality of
wealth and power resulting from monopolies. 14 He claimed that
only Congress is able to deal with the threat, and that "if we are
unwilling or unable there will soon be a trust for every production
and a master to fix the price for every necessity of life."' 48 This
concern for the people's helplessness in the face of the trusts is
also reflected in the comments of Senator George of Mississippi,
but he too refers to entrepreneurial rights of the people. 4 9 Despite
143. 21 CoNG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
144. Id. at 2460, 2598.
145. Id. at 2457.
146. Senator Sherman described the intent of the Act as follows:
This bill, as I would have it, has for its single object to invoke the aid of the
courts of the United States to deal with the combinations described in the first
section when they affect injuriously our foreign and interstate commerce and
our revenue laws, and in this way to supplement the enforcement of the estab-
lished rules of the common and statute law by the courts of the several States
in dealing with combinations that affect injuriously the industrial liberty of the
citizens of these States.
Id.
147. Senator Sherman stated:
The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb social order,
and among them all none is more threatening than the inequality of condition,
of wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a single generation out of the
concentration of capital into vast combinations to control production and trade
and to break down competition.
Id. at 2460.
148. Id.
149. See 21 CONG. REc. 2598 (1890) (statement of Sen. George):
It is a sad thought to the philanthropist that the present system of production
and of exchange is having that tendency which is sure at some not very distant
day to crush out all small men, all small capitalists, all small enterprises. This
is being done now. We find everywhere over our land the wrecks of small, inde-
pendent enterprises thrown in our pathway.
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the concern for wealth distribution, excessive market power, and
economic opportunity, each is discussed in another section of this
Article. These commentators draw no explict distinction between
individual liberty and these concerns.
Among antitrust authorities, no one has been as steadfastly con-
cerned with the human liberty and justice implications of the anti-
trust laws as Professor Louis Schwartz. In several works,15 0 Profes-
sor Schwartz articulates, as clearly as appears anywhere in the
legal literature, the impact of institutional size. To him, freedom of
choice and action usually refer to economic and political choice
and action. In the economic sphere, businessmen are to be free
from direction and coercion of other businessmen; buyers are to be
free from concerted exploitation by sellers; sellers are to be free
from exploitative buyers. In the political sphere, the concentration
of economic power in a few hands and the power of the press, edu-
cational institutions and government jeopardize political liberty.
To the extent that other forms of human dignity and self-worth
are associated with deconcentration, Schwartz associates them
with the ability to strike out on one's own, to win fortune from the
patronage of one's fellowmen: "Freedom on the economic frontier
is today's only substitute for the open Western lands which in
other generations nourished American individualism."'' These are
either entrepreneurial freedoms, discussed in the following section,
or political freedoms, discussed in the previous section.
According to Schwartz, concentrated power diminished the di-
versity of products and services, as well as points of view in books,
newspapers, movies, sports, and employment opportunities.'52 Al-
though the diversity of products and services is an industrial goal,
discussed separately in Part IV, the diversity of points of view sug-
gests a cultural ambiance destroyed by bigness. Schwartz discusses
The people complain; the people suffer; the people in many parts of our
country, especially the agricultural people, are in greater distress than they
have ever been before. They look with longing eyes, they turn their faces to us
with pleading hands asking us to do something to relieve them from their
trouble.
150. Schwartz, supra note 76, at 867; see Schwartz, Institutional Size, supra note 16;
Schwartz, "Justice" and other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, supra note 16.
151. Schwartz, supra note 76, at 867.
152. Schwartz, American Antitrust Laws and Free Enterprise, Swiss REV. INT'L ANTI-
TRUST L. 3, 4 (Jan. 1978).
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the authoritarian aspects of bigness, not only in the context of big
business, but also in the context of big government, big unions,
armies, charities, and political parties. 53 He believes that antitrust
is the obvious remedy for excessive concentration of industrial,
commercial, and financial power154 when organizations can be re-
stricted to units no larger than technological considerations justify
or can be subject to price controls and public utility type
regulation.5 5
Relevant to the individual liberties issue is Schwartz's claim that
bigness leads to immunity from external criticism and inquiry. Ap-
parently quality of life as well as economic performance suffers
from the fact that employees will not criticize their employers for
fear of losing their jobs. 56 This concern reflects the same kind of
feeling of powerlessness and loss of control that generally accompa-
nies corporate abuse of discretionary power. Judge Learned Hand,
in United States v. Aluminum Corp. of America,167 wrote that
more than an economic motivation lay behind Congress' enactment
of the Sherman Act: "It is possible, because of its indirect social or
moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent
for his success upon his own skill and character, to one in which
the great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a
few.,)15 8
Discussion of nonentrepreneurial freedoms boils down to con-
cern with structural and behavioral characteristics of firms and
markets as well as other industrial goals, procedural fairness,
wealth distribution, excessive corporate political power, and bad
effects of centralization and discretionary authority. All but the
153. Schwartz, Institutional Size, supra note 16, at 4. The writing of William Curran,
supra note 16, which combines criticism of the economic implications of bigness with a
vague sense of cultural corruption due to large economic units, may be a modern statement
of these same views. He argues for an alternative set of goals-in fact, an alternative concep-
tion of society-based on cooperation and harmony rather than competition. The cultural
corruption from bigness comes from its destruction of a sense of community, a oneness, a
sharing in the endeavor to satisfy our physical needs. Rather than molding competition to
serve larger goals, he would eliminate competition and capitalism as an underlying premise
to establish a more harmonious and free society.
154. Schwartz, Institutional Size, supra note 16, at 22.
155. Id. at 22-23.
156. Id. at 7-8 & n.7.
157. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
158. Id. at 427.
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last are dealt with elsewhere in this Article. What remains is the
redistribution of power from citizens to corporations.
Having stripped away the layers of concern for nonefficiency
goals, the core may be a simple concern that large corporations
have too much control over our lives. Commentators distinguish
this concern from the lack of control over the impersonal forces of
the competitive market. Although businesses will constantly be
shifting resources from one sector to another and will inevitably
disrupt civic life, the decisions of large firms are considered more
arbitrary, unfair, and unacceptable. 15 Professor Scherer describes
one of the benefits of competition as the impersonal nature of deci-
sion making as compared to decisions made under the personal
control of entrepreneurs or bureaucrats: "There is nothing more
galling than to have the achievement of some desired objective
frustrated by the decision of an identifiable individual or group.
On the other hand, who can work up much outrage about a setback
administered by the impersonal interplay of competitive market
forces?" 6 0
Addressing the goal of defeating this feeling of powerlessness
due to corporate exercise of discretionary power and thereby
regaining control is in no way incompatible with the empirical ap-
proach discussed in this Article. In a democracy, the means of ob-
taining or regaining power over the external effects of the decisions
159. Brodley, supra note 88, at 874, states that:
[Miergers accentuate a basic problem of capitalist societies.... These sudden
and often hurtful effects, while never welcome, tend to become less acceptable
as the decisionmaker grows larger and more remote. At some point, the social
consequences subject to sudden single firm choice as a result of merger become
so large that they appear simply "unfair" and unacceptable - at which point
pervasive regulation is likely.
160. F. SCHERER, supra note 48, at 13. As Edward Dauer suggests and administration offi-
cials agree, one need not show any more than a politically expressed preference for dealing
with smaller corporations to justify a prohibition of large firms in a democracy. Antitrust
Dialogue on Social Science, Cultural Values and Merger Law, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. No. 4
(1989) (forthcoming). To design a less arbitrary and minimally intrusive merger law enforce-
ment policy, however, it would be useful to identify the ways in which large corporations
affect our well-being. If the undesirable effect is through the products they sell, the diversity
they offer, or the service they provide, the issue is dealt with under industrial goals. If the
problem is their political power, the issue is dealt with in that discussion. If the problem is
the effect on communities, employees, or would-be competitors, those problems are also dis-
cussed in their turn. The underlying problem remains-something less tangible, the feeling
of powerlessness, of lack of control.
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of private parties is the political process. Controlling external ef-
fects of discretionary power by forcing absentee managers' firms to
bear the local costs of their decisions might mean preventing firms
from merging unless they agreed not to relocate their production
processes, agreed to give reasonable notice of intent to shut down
plants, or promised to retrain workers dislocated as a result of
their corporate reorganization. Without regard to the desirability
of such control of corporate discretion, as an exercise of political
power, this control is not analytically different from any regulation
of the external effects of corporate activity such as internalizing
the environmental costs of pollution. Enforcing the antitrust laws
to achieve the other nonefficiency goals also accomplishes the
reempowering of citizens and overcomes both the ill effects of the
exercise of corporate discretion and the intangible feeling of
powerlessness.
E. Protection of Entrepreneurial Freedom
1. The meaning of entrepreneurial freedom
Judicial decisions and commentary concerned with en-
trepreneurial freedom have revealed two strains of opinion on the
subject: the first would protect small businesses in order to in-
crease the freedom of individuals to be self-employed and self-reli-
ant and the second would protect small businesses in order to pro-
mote an economic system that better satisfies consumer
demands. 161 A policy based on the former would encourage en-
forcement of a set of rules that gives small firms an advantage in
the competitive process. The latter would encourage enforcement
of a set of rules that places large and small firms on the same foot-
ing by eliminating the counterproductive advantages large firms
possess in dealing with buyers and sellers.
161. Perhaps small enterprises should receive preferential treatment. Professor Schwartz
lists a variety of areas, from federal projects and utility regulation to banking regulation,
which reveal public interest in promoting small businesses. Schwartz, supra note 76. Many
of the reasons for favoring small enterprise have been discussed in prior sections on decen-
tralized political power, see supra Part III.C., advantages to local communities, see supra
Part III.D., and economic freedoms, see supra Part IH.E. Others are incorporated into the
"middle tier" economic goals such as desirable diversity of products, innovation, and flexi-
bility, which are included in the broader approach to the meaning of competition. See infra
Part IV.A.
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Affirmative historical support for small enterprise stems from
Jefferson's preference for decentralized power. The Jeffersonian
notion of economic freedom for individuals includes a preference
for self-employment as a way to maintain economic as well as po-
litical freedom. 162 For other commentators who follow this view,
the goal is summarized as the freedom to choose or change one's
way of life,' which is enhanced by preserving the opportunity to
be self-employed.6 These statements suggest a private benefit to
protecting small firms-the feeling of freedom the availability of
economic opportunity generates in citizens and the potential to ex-
ercise one's entrepreneurial skill and perhaps acquire material
wealth. This concern regularly found expression in the opinions of
Justice Douglas.6 5 In his majority opinion in Ford Motor Co. v.
United States, 66 Douglas identified the spirit of the amendments
162. See Mueller's interpretation of the Jeffersonian economic and political ideal, in
Mueller, Small Business and Big Monopoly: The Galbraithian 'Socialist Imperative,' 10
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., No. 1, at 17, 23 (1978):
The best society is one composed of the largest feasible number of independent
entrepreneurs, free men who bend their knee only to Divine Providence, who
personally own the tools of their trade, who work in accordance with rules of
their own making and thus take no orders from any other mortal man.
163. See, e.g., R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 213-54 (1955); Mueller, supra note
162, at 17; Pertschuck & Davidson, supra note 117.
164. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 15,867 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Reed):
Accordingly we wrote it into our creed, that all men were created free and
equal, and that all are entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. We
construed "liberty" to mean not merely the right to walk upon the streets of
cities . . . but liberty . . . to engage in commerce, to solve for one's self the
problem of one's own happiness and success....
So we began enacting legislation calculated to produce a condition which
would leave open for all men, big and little, the opportunity to engage in the
affairs of life.
Presumably this opportunity extends not just to men of different heights but also to busi-
ness organizations with many or as few as one employee.
165. See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 543 (1973) (Douglas,
J., concurring):
By reason of the antitrust laws, efficiency in terms of the accounting of dol-
lar costs and profits is not the measure of the public interest nor is growth in
size where no substantial competition is curtailed. The antitrust laws look with
suspicion on the acquisition of local business units by out-of-state companies.
For then local employment is apt to suffer, local payrolls are likely to drop off,
and responsible entrepreneurs in counties and States are replaced by clerks.
A nation of clerks is anathema to the American antitrust dream.
166. 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
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to the Clayton Act by quoting remarks of its proponent Senator
Kefauver: "'[If our democracy is going to survive in this country
we must keep competition, and we must see to it that the basic
materials and resources of the country are available to any little
fellow who wants to go into business.' "1167 Professor Eleanor Fox
has recognized that freedom of economic opportunity is the one
central theme of the legislative history of the Clayton Act. She ar-
gues that during this period of rugged individualism, people gladly
would have sacrificed increased efficiency for increased freedom."6 8
Jefferson's individual economic freedom is clearly different from
the ability of corporations to compete. Although Douglas cited
Senator Kefauver as a protector of individual freedom,'69 there is
substantial reason to believe that Kefauver was concerned not only
with the private benefit of economic opportunity but also with the
public benefit of constructive competitive behavior. Arguing in
1945 for a strengthening of section 7, Kefauver described the pro-
motion of individual freedom as a way of determining the sort of
country in which we will live:170 "When the destiny of people over
the land is dependent upon the decision of two or three people in a
central office somewhere, then the people are going to demand that
the Government do something about it." His primary emphasis
combines his concern for the competitive process with concern for
individual economic opportunity:
I do want to urge, while there is still time to save our free econ-
omy, before we reach the point of concentration where we are
going to have a demand for state control of these basic indus-
tries, in order to preserve our free-enterprise system where every
person and small corporation can have an opportunity of com-
peting, that this committee exercise its good judgment and
[amend] section 7 of the Clayton Act... 171
Decentralized enterprise is therefore necessary not only to protect
individual liberty, but also to ensure competition on the merits.
167. Id. at 569 n.5 (citing Hearing on H.R. 988 et seq. Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1949)).
168. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1140,
1152-53 & nn.71-72 (1981).
169. 405 U.S. at 569 n.5.
170. See Hearings on H.R. 988, supra note 167, at 12..
171. Id. at 13.
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The modern political view that small businesses need protection
for the good of society reflects the sense that large business over-
whelms the individualistic spirit of the small entrepreneur and un-
dermines the ideals of free opportunity; this view suggests that the
individualistic spirit contributes a necessary element to the com-
petitive system.172
As this shift in emphasis from individual liberty to procompeti-
tive benefits evolved, it became apparent that tradeoffs between
the benefits of small enterprise and productive efficiency existed.
In a message to Congress in 1938, Franklin Roosevelt recognized
implicitly that a line had to be drawn; he spoke of increasing finan-
cial and management control of business by placing it in fewer and
fewer hands, thereby eliminating the independent position of small
businessmen in American life and destroying private initiative.17 3
Roosevelt tempered the Jeffersonian ideal, however, realizing that
although gains would result from employing modern methods of
production, permitting mergers and acquisitions that merely con-
solidate control without increasing efficiency would only serve fur-
ther to destroy individual initiative.
The reach from Jefferson to Roosevelt is a long one. By 1938, the
notion of individual self-employment had given way to a recogni-
tion of economies of scale and an apparent willingness to sacrifice
172. President Wilson's address to a joint session of Congress on the proposed limitation
on interlocking directorates supports this view: "It will bring new men, new energies, a new
spirit of initiative, new blood, into the management of our great business enterprises. It will
open the field of industrial development and origination to scores of men who have been
obliged to serve when their abilities entitled them to direct." See ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT
ON TRUSTS AND MONOPOLIES BEFORE THE JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS, H.R. Doc. No. 625,
63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1914), cited in Fox, supra note 168, at 1149 n.41.
Eleanor Fox, whose discussion of this viewpoint is most instructive, identifies the interests
of entrepreneurs and small business as "the heart and lifeblood of American free enter-
prise," and freedom of economic activity and opportunity as "central to the preservation of
the American free enterprise system." Fox, supra note 168, at 1153-54 (recognizing the
procompetitive benefits of promoting small business).
173. In his address the President stated: "No one suggests that we return to the hand
loom or hand forge.... But modern efficient mass production is not furthered by a central
control which destroys competition between industrial plants each capable of efficient mass
production while operating as separate units." Address by the President, reprinted in Final
Report and Recommendations of the Temporary National Economic Committee, S. Doc.
No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1945) (cited in Fox, Economic Concentration, Efficiencies
and Competition: Social Goals and Political Choices, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 882, 890 & n.21
(1978)).
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economic freedom (in the Jeffersonian sense) to increase output.
Part of the benefit to competition of increasing the size of enter-
prises through mergers is that it encourages individual enterprise.
Significantly, acquisition of small firms permit entrepreneurs, who
have developed a new enterprise, to reap the rewards of their am-
bition and talent by selling to an established firm. 174 This opportu-
nity to be bought out may provide extra incentive to start small
enterprises, but it must be balanced against the potentially demor-
alizing effect of having to compete with some of those would-be
acquirers during the entry stage.
These comments, from Jefferson to Wilson, Roosevelt, and
Kefauver, present what appears to be a dichotomous choice be-
tween economic efficiency and a quality of life or cultural ambi-
ance. Kefauver raises most explicitly the issue of deciding in what
kind of country we want to live. Relying on economic efficiency
alone ignores the quality of life questions that have two roots-the
promotion of the spirit of individual economic opportunity for its
own sake and the promotion of competition.
2. Incorporating concern for entrepreneurial freedom into
merger law enforcement
If one starts with the broad assumption that the independent
variable limiting economic opportunity is the size of enterprises,
then the dependent variable might be either individual freedom or
individual initiative, the former representing the detrimental effect
on liberty and the latter representing the detrimental effect on the
competitive process of having large firms. In both cases, the ill ef-
fects result from suppression of individual opportunity by the hier-
archical or dominating nature of large organizations. To have a co-
174. Wilson suggests that entrepreneurial talent is quite different from managerial talent
and that once a firm gets large enough to have over 300 employees, the entrepreneur may
desire to sell out to a managerial specialist, such as an existing larger competitor or a con-
glomerate. Wilson, Small Business and the Jeffersonian Heritage: Portrait of the Entrepre-
neur, 11 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., No. 3, at 33, 48 (1979). Under this theory, motivations
to sell may not only be financial but psychological. Wilson states that for the en-
trepreneurial type of personality, "[flathering [i]s [w]here [t]he [f]un [i]s." Id. Stewart sug-
gests that it is the independence from bureaucracy that characterizes the freedom of en-
trepreneurial opportunity. Stewart, The Case for 'Smallness. Entrepreneurship,
Conglomerates, and the Good Economic Society, 11 ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. RE V., No. 2, at
67, 71 (1979).
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herent merger policy that allows any mergers at all but prohibits
those that result in larger enterprises is difficult, at least in part
because a merger inherently involves the combining of enterprises
and concomitant enlargement. This fact makes it very difficult to
employ the merger laws to promote small business for its own sake.
a. Merger law and individual liberty
The inappropriateness of the merger laws as a policy tool for
promoting small business for the sake of individual liberty is ap-
parent whether the merging parties are small or large firms. Pre-
sumably a major loss in economic freedom occurs when the inde-
pendent farmer becomes a farm hand and a further diminution
occurs whenever more layers of bureaucracy come between the
worker and those deciding his economic fate. But is there not a
point of diminishing incremental decrease in freedom? Is there any
incremental loss in individual freedom when two multibillion dol-
lar firms merge or has all the individual freedom of the sort con-
cerned here already been lost? At this level of enterprise size, there
hardly seems to be any additional loss of opportunity to strike out
on one's own.
To promote small enterprise for its own sake through the merger
laws requires cases involving enterprises so small that the eco-
nomic liberty of entrepreneurs is affected by the takeover. If the
small firm is closely held, however, the entrepreneur/owner will sell
her enterprise only if the price exceeds the value to her of remain-
ing independent. If the individual entrepreneur has decided to
share control with others by selling shares in his enterprise, then
the owners (shareholders) decide at what price they will sell and
those potentially disadvantaged are the management. To the ex-
tent that the management and the entrepreneur are the same per-
son, the individual has taken the risk of losing control by going
public and, presuming no unfair competitive behavior on the part
of the acquiring firm, has received a price that reflects the eco-
nomic opportunities in the market. The mergers of large firms,
then, do not present the issue of interference with entrepreneurial
liberty and small firms have self-protective devices that ensure the
satisfaction of entrepreneur/owners as long as the rules ensure a
fair competitive process.
[Vol. 30:787
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Neither large nor small firm mergers result in harm to individual
liberty as Jefferson perceived it as long as the mergers do not re-
sult from or result in individual entrepreneurs being disadvantaged
in the marketplace. But the assumption that the acquiring firm has
used no unfair tactics and that large firms are unable to disadvan-
tage small firms is critical. Contemporary discussion of protection
of small firms focuses more on ensuring that the competitive pro-
cess is fair to small businesses than protecting each individual's
right to be self-employed.
b. Merger law and procedural fairness
President Roosevelt apparently believed that the economic bene-
fits of small businesses could be achieved by preventing mergers
that concentrate control without increasing productive effi-
ciency."'h If some large scale organizations experience productive
efficiency benefits and these are to be achieved, then small busi-
nesses will not be assured the same probability of success as the
large firms. Following Roosevelt's suggestion, however, the small
scale entrepreneur may be assured that he will not be disadvan-
taged by practices in which the large firm is able to engage because
of size but which have no independent benefit to society. Without
diminishing productive efficiency potential, antitrust law may en-
sure equal entrepreneurial opportunity to compete but not equal
probability of success.
It appears that protecting the opportunity to compete is the
dominant theme among those of most political persuasions and
among historical figures." 6 This distinction between ensuring the
right to succeed and protecting the right to compete on fair terms
is echoed in modern commentary. Professor Flynn concludes that
"powerful buyers and sellers often tell small business where they
may sell, to whom they may sell, at what price they may sell and
sometimes whether they may remain in business at all. '177 Flynn
175. See Fox, supra note 168.
176. Expressions of these themes by Justice Brandeis appear in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS:
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS 106-07 (0. Fraenkel ed. 1935).
177. Flynn, Reaganomics, supra note 18, at 302. Flynn states:
Where not clearly justified, the exercise of such power interfering with individ-
ual economic freedom is just as objectionable as the unjustified exercise of gov-
ernment power interfering with individual political freedom. The refusal to in-
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proposes to ensure optimal survival of small business by emphasiz-
ing that the "basic purpose of the antitrust laws is to guarantee
that everyone engaged in economic activity in this society is enti-
tled, to the maximum extent possible, to have their success or fail-
ure governed by a competitive process.' 178 This is clearly a concern
for fair rules rather than special preferences for small firms.
Achieving the goal of ensuring equal opportunity to compete re-
quires a change in current enforcement strategy. One tends to
think of the Sherman Act as providing remedies for anticompeti-
tive acts. Section 2 is designed to prevent practices by a single firm
other than mergers and acquisitions that might lead to that firm
acquiring market power, and section 1 is designed to prevent firms
from acting in concert to engage in anticompetitive acts. In addi-
tion, numerous other statutes were designed to prevent unfair or
disadvantageous practices, prominent among them the Federal
Trade Commission Act and the Robinson Patmann Act. However,
section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers when "the effect of
such acquisition may be sustantially to lessen competition. ' 179
That section is currently enforced to emphasize the efficiency goals
to prevent mergers that are likely to allow firms to obtain power to
increase prices. An expanded view of competition that takes into
account the concern for the economic role of small firms would
prevent mergers that unjustifiably permit the acquisition of the
power to disadvantage competitors. Part IV considers a broader
notion of competition and develops a notion of social efficiency
that encourages a balancing of efficiency and nonefficiency
concerns.
terject antitrust policy into the situation means that the small businesses have
no counterweight to the exercise of undue power by the economically powerful.
Thus, we sacrifice the competitive contribution of the small on the altar of an
unjustified presumption in favor of bigness. This is an unrealistic blindness to
power in the economy.
Id.
178. Id. at 303.
179. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-732 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
18 (1982)).
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IV. EXPANDING THE NOTION OF EFFICIENCY AND COMPETITION
The previous sections have described efficiency goals and nonef-
ficiency goals, two contrasting perspectives of the purposes under-
lying antitrust laws. Current enforcement policy focuses only on
the former, considering the latter goals too alien to the notion of
competition to be appropriate concerns of antitrust enforcers, too
incomprehensible to be relevant to the enforcement process, and,
to the extent that they can be articulated clearly, achievable as
side-effects of a narrow focus on allocative efficiency. This section
presents a broader view of competition that permits the inclusion
of a wider variety of concerns and offers a redefinition of efficiency,
based on this broader interpretation of competition, that encour-
ages the enforcer to take noneconomic values into account in a sys-
tematic way. This perspective is illustrated by extending the no-
tion of efficiency into the concern for distribution of wealth, which
many commentators agree is alien to antitrust enforcement.' The
discussion of distributional equity is designed to demonstrate the
ability of the merger law enforcement to address even those con-
cerns totally divorced from the usual focus on allocative and pro-
ductive efficiency. Throughout this secion, the inability of a mar-
ket power orientation to achieve nonefficiency goals is illustrated.
The final section incorporates other nonefficiency goals into the
broader view of competition and social efficiency.
A. A Broader View of Competition
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions
that may substantially lessen competition.' The variety of defini-
tions of competition that appear in the literature offer a choice
that affects the way in which the merger statute will be construed.
Robert Bork describes and rejects four alternatives before settling
on a fifth, 82 which uses the word "competition" to designate "any
state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be increased by
moving to an alternative state of affairs through judicial decree."' 83
180. See Pitofsky, supra note 28, at 1060; Williamson, supra note 40, at 711.
181. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-732 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
18 (1982)).
182. R. BORK, supra note 31, at 58-61.
183. Id. at 61.
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Bork uses the concept of consumer welfare to describe all things
desirable about competition: not only the fact that low prices re-
sult, but that competition encourages innovation, diversity in prod-
ucts, and other preferred properties of industrial and market be-
havior. In short, consumer welfare is "all things we think of as
being good for consumers." 184 Bork contrasts this approach with
George Stigler's definition of competition as a state of the market
"in which the individual buyer or seller does not influence the
price by his purchases or sales."18 5 Bork then rejects it as being
"utterly useless as a goal of law" because it "deliberately leaves out
considerations of technology,' 18 6 by which he apparently means
productive efficiency considerations and other beneficial properties
of competition. Stigler's definition ignores any considerations other
than market power.
The greater breadth of Bork's approach to competition, and to
efficiency, is emphasized in his discussion of productive efficiency,
in which he includes not only the ability of a particular firm to
produce at least cost, but the ability of an industry to satisfy the
broad spectrum of consumer demands most effectively. Using this
approach, productive efficiency need not refer only to the cost of
the output of a firm; it might also refer to the cost of producing
anything by any social institution or society.187 One might speak,
then, of the least costly way of producing technological advances,
which might involve a question of finding the kind of industry
structure-firms with large or small market shares, firms with mas-
sive or meager capital resources-that produces technological ad-
vances at least cost.188
184. Id.
185. G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 87 (3d ed. 1966).
186. R. BORK, supra note 31, at 59.
187. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
188. Issues relating to optimal industry structure and social organization to produce tech-
nological advances have been studied at length by industrial organization economists as part
of their study of the economic characteristics of firm size. See F. SCHERER, supra note 48, at
413-15. Opportunities for restructuring industries to achieve this goal depend on particular
characteristics of the industries involved. The goal of structuring the economy to produce
technological advances most efficiently may thus be seen as a species of the productive effi-
ciency goal. The restructuring of an economy to produce a greater variety of products or
more rapid technological advance is clearly a distinct goal in itself, separate from what is
referred to in Part II.B. as productive efficiency. Judge Bork recognizes this difference, re-
ferring to the traditional notion of productive efficiency, which he associates with the writ-
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A set of "industrial" goals, then, falls logically between the nar-
rowly defined efficiency goals discussed in Part II and the social
and political values discussed in Part III. These goals represent a
second tier of desirable properties of the competitive process, that
are not price or output or cost-of-production characteristics and
were not considered by the Reagan administration to be relevant
to the merger law enforcement process.189 The expanded view of
competition suggests properties that are relevant to the merger law
inquiry, such as the abilities of an industry to respond flexibly to
changes in economic conditions exogenous to the firms (such as re-
cession and inflation), to respond quickly to changes in consumer
demand, to develop new products and to invent more efficient pro-
duction techniques and adapt them quickly to produce a diversity
of products that are relevant to merger law. 910 These industrial
goals are acceptable to many of those who advocate an exclusive
focus on efficiency goals,' 9' but are not accepted as part of the
ings of Professor Williamson, as simply "cost-cutting." R. BORK, supra note 31, at 128-29.
But see Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, 59 AM. EcoN. REV.
105 (1969); Williamson, supra note 40, at 18.
189. See generally Justice Guidelines, supra note 23. For instance, in some industries,
research and development activity is undoubtedly the key to competitiveness and market
share. In such an industry a merger between two companies might produce economies of
scale in research that would be a factor for consideration in evaluating the anticompetitive
effects of the merger under the Justice Department Guidelines.
190. This list can go on almost endlessly. Louis Schwartz adds that free enterprise can
give us a wider variety of points of view in books, newspapers, movies, and sports, wider
choice of employment, and more responsiveness of firms to local exigencies. See Schwartz,
Institutional Size, supra note 16, at 5.
191. Advocates of the efficiency focus argue that a competitive system composed of firms
with no market power would produce these desirable "industrial" characteristics automati-
cally, because the market rewards those who adapt most quickly to changes in economic
conditions, who engage in the most customer-pleasing product development, or who develop
or adopt more efficient production technologies. Thus, there is no need to convince free
market advocates to focus on these industrial goals. The goals are best achieved by a free
market system without explicit government intervention in these areas. For instance, some
economists believe that the existence of monopolies inhibits the adjustment of the economy
to conditions of declining demand, as would occur during a recession. A monopolist might
find it more profitable to decrease output in response to a decline in demand than to lower
price, which would interfere with the market's ability to reequilibrate supply and demand
and aggravate the economic dislocations that result from a recession. By focusing antitrust
enforcement on market power that would allow firms profitably to maintain high prices in a
period of declining demand, antitrust policy simultaneously accomplishes the allocative effi-
ciency goal of promoting a price equal to marginal cost and the industrial goal of promoting
economic stability. See, e.g., Mueller, Antitrust and Economics: A Look at "Competition,"
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
"market power" focus of the Justice Department Guidelines or the
Merger Modernization Act. Many of these industrial goals would
fit within Judge Bork's list of the desirable characteristics of com-
petition and are, according to Bork, part of the "primary value
Congress had in mind when it used the word"192 "competition" in
the antitrust statutes.
Perhaps the reason some commentators, such as Judge Bork ex-
plicitly and free market economists implicitly, include some of
these macroeconomics and industrial properties of an economic
structure among the antitrust goals and exclude social and political
goals is related to the fact that these industry characteristics or
goals have an impact on people in society as consumers while the
other goals affect individuals in the roles of would-be entrepre-
neurs, employees, or citizens. It seems likely, however, that the re-
luctance may also be due to a fear of admitting that conflicting
antitrust policy goals must be achieved simultaneously. Professor
Eleanor Fox, for instance, who succinctly describes four economic
goals as the historical foundations for antitrust policy, rejects the
concern for preservation of small firm size for its own sake
"[b]ecause of the unusual potential for conflict between this objec-
tive and consumers' interests.' 193 The current trend in Supreme
Court opinions also illustrates this fear of conflicting goals. Recent
opinions describe the antitrust laws as consumer welfare statutes""
and, by defining consumer welfare to exclude other concerns of cit-
10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 482, 491-92 (1966). Mueller cites Attorney General Katzenback, who
explicitly recognizes the connection between antitrust policy and economic stability: "If you
get a rigid price structure, then reactions to changes in the business cycle are stickier and
you have more trouble when you start getting into a recession. In this way the antitrust laws
are closely related to all indirect monetary controls and other tools of government." Id. at
492. Gardiner Means describes historical examples that illustrate conditions under which
this automatic adjustment of prices to demand does not occur. Means, Conglomerates and
Concentration, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 12 (1970).
Similarly, some associate inflation with increasing market concentration, which increases
the ability of firms to raise prices even with no change in the underlying costs. See, e.g., Y.
BROZEN, CONCENTRATION, MERGERS, AND PUBLIC POLICY ch. 3 (1982); Means, supra, at 14-15.
192. R. BORK, supra note 31, at 61.
193. Fox, supra note 168, at 1182.
194. Former Chief Justice Burger first referred to the concept of "consumer welfare" (cit-
ing to R. BORK, supra note 31, at 66) in the majority opinion of Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979). Justice Stevens also used the term in the majority opinion of
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
107 (1984). The term has also appeared in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
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izens and entrepreneurs, ignore the other social implications of an-
titrust enforcement policy.
195
The nonefficiency goals in Part III are social and political goals
that relate to individuals in roles other than consumer. Because
the consumer-related goals such as diversity of products, techno-
logical innovation, flexibility, or responsiveness to demand have
been investigated in some depth by the theoretical and empirical
economic literature and because they are not treated with such dis-
dain as are the social and political goals, they will not be treated at
length here. It is more interesting to focus on the extreme oppo-
sites of the efficiency goals and attempt to determine whether they
deserve their characterization as "'pure intellectual mush.' "196
A review of the nonefficiency goals demonstrates that society is
concerned with more than either allocative and productive effi-
ciency or the industrial goals. Bork's broadened definition of com-
petition opens the policies of antitrust law to the protection of all
things desirable about competition, that is, to all desirable proper-
ties that result from decentralized market structures. The broadest
useful definition is not too far removed conceptually from Bork's
approach, though it may be far removed ideologically. The legisla-
tive history, case law, and commentary all suggest that competition
yields beneficial results not only for members of society in their
roles as consumers, but also in their roles as citizens and entrepre-
neurs. Accepting this history and scholarship forces one to recog-
nize that a strict efficiency orientation, or even one that included a
focus on industrial goals, ignores other values one might choose to
achieve by promoting competition. Economists agree that prevent-
ing the acquisition and exercise of market power protects individ-
U.S. 2, 45 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) and Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332, 367 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
195. A second reason for the exclusion may be the empirical support for industrial goals,
such as the belief that there is a relationship between industry structures (defined by con-
centration ratios, for instance) and flexibility, product development, or investment in re-
search and development. See, e.g., J. KOCH, supra note 49, at 213-33 (discussing market
structure and technological change); F. SCHERER, supra note 48, at 407-39 (discussing the
relationship between firm size, diversification, and market power as independent variables
and invention, innovation, research, and development as dependent variables).
196. Judge Bork, who has a penchant for offhand and casual derogation of theories not
encompassed in his own world view, has alternatively categorized the social and political
goals as "pure intellectual mush." See supra note 1.
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ual entrepreneurs. Economists, however, are hesitant to recognize
that a legislature might prefer to sacrifice some of the allocative
and productive efficiency gains associated with a deconcentrated
market to provide additional freedom of entry to would-be
competitors.
As an illustration of this apparent professional myopia, consider
the failure of economists to systematically incorporate any societal
preferences for distribution of wealth into antitrust policy. Because
a broad view of efficiency requires that law be interpreted to maxi-
mize all of the benefits from competition, the following section ex-
amines how a concern for the equitable distribution of wealth can
be incorporated into merger law enforcement and illustrates the
way in which the maximization of social efficiency, an interpreta-
tion of the efficiency goals that maximizes not only the output of
goods and services but all desires reflected through the democratic
process in a society, may require the balancing of allocative and
productive efficiency goals with other values.
B. Social Efficiency and Equitable Distribution
Among the qualities of a competitive economy and an economic
system characterized by allocative efficiency is a distribution of
wealth that favors providing any surplus of value over cost of pro-
duction to the consumer rather than to the producer. Because it
requires the equality of price and marginal cost, allocative effi-
ciency satisfies this basic distributional preference. Additionally,
economists maintain that it is difficult to speak of a more favorable
distribution of wealth between consumers and producers in an
economy that is not predominantly and systematically character-
ized by government subsidies to producers who would have to sell
at a loss to achieve a more radical distribution of wealth. In any
event, not only is the price-equals-marginal-cost goal the only dis-
tributional goal given prominence in the antitrust literature, but
commentators maintain that the income redistribution achieved
through the antitrust laws is trivial.197 Yet there is reason to be-
lieve that the original concern with "the dread enhancement of
197. Pitofsky, supra note 28, at 1059-60. Elzinga, supra note 22, at 1195, recognizes that
pursuing a monopoly will benefit whatever class of consumers (rich or poor) buy that mo-
nopolist's product.
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prices ' 19s was a concern for the redistribution of wealth from con-
sumers to producers rather than a concern for inefficiency. 9 '
In Part III.C., allocative efficiency and equitable distribution
goals were distinguished by describing the emphasis of the former
as being the level of output of each product produced and the lat-
ter as involving a choice of who receives how much wealth. 200 Al-
though distinguishable as goals, the two are inevitably intertwined
because both the level of output and the distribution of wealth are
determined by the price charged for the product. If the antitrust
laws are to be interpreted as related to the welfare of consumers,
then the impact of price on distribution as well as on allocation of
resources across production alternatives is reasonably part of the
equation.
The significance of the wealth distribution effect of allocative
inefficiency and the difference between allocative efficiency con-
cerns and distributional concerns is illustrated by confusion over
the words "consumer welfare." The welfare of consumers is not to
be confused with the term of art "consumer welfare," which is in-
tended as a distributionally neutral term. As the discussion below
illustrates, economists view a transfer of wealth from consumers to
producers as a neutral event, something with which antitrust pol-
icy is not to be concerned.20 The approach of the Reagan adminis-
198. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1910) (stating that fear of in-
creased prices and "other wrongs" led to the antitrust laws).
199. See Fox, supra note 168, at 1147 & nn.30-32, and Lande, supra note 68, at 129
(quoting 51 CONG. REC. 9186 (1914) (statement of Rep. Helvering)). Senator Sherman de-
scribed inequality of wealth as one of the problems that agitated "the popular mind." 21
CONG. REc. 2460 (1890). Senator Vest noted that when you "create competition, you then
secure lower prices to the consumer." 21 CONG. REc. 2466 (1890). See also Horizontal
Merger Guidelines of the National Association of Attorneys General, reprinted in 52 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1306, at S-4 (March 12, 1987) [hereinafter NAAG
Guidelines] ("This transfer of wealth is the major evil sought to be addressed by Section
7.") The Guidelines cite wealth transfer as the predominant concern of both the supporters
and opponents of the Celler-Kefauver amendment of the Clayton Act in 1949. Id. at S-4
n.18.
200. See supra note 50.
201. See infra text accompanying notes 207-14 (discussing Williamson's welfare trade-off
model). The National Association of Attorney's General deprecate this supposedly neutral
use of the term "consumer welfare" in their Horizontal Merger Guidelines, saying:
In most mergers creating market power, the effect of the wealth transfer from
consumers will be many times as great quantitatively as the effect on allocative
efficiency.... It is important to re-emphasize that wealth transfer is irrelevant
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tration was to ignore distributional concerns, relying on the main-
tenance of the price/marginal cost equality through the pursuit of
allocative efficiency to produce the appropriate distribution of
wealth. This approach was theoretically correct, because the inabil-
ity of firms to acquire market power also prevents the undesired
transfer of excess wealth to corporations via higher prices. The ex-
tent to which the distributional concerns are satisfied, however, de-
pends on the strategy by which allocative efficiency is pursued.
The impact on wealth distribution of merger law enforcement
depends on strategy in two illustrative areas, among others: (1) de-
ciding the acceptable duration of market power that both allows
competitors to take market share from a firm charging supracom-
petitive prices and prevents excessive transfer of wealth from con-
sumers to that firm in the interim and (2) determining the extent
to which productive efficiency gains from a merger should be al-
lowed to offset allocative efficiency losses. From the distributional
perspective, and from many others, the enforcement problem is de-
termining the extent to which consumers are likely to be harmed
by a merger. The enforcement decisions have a direct effect on the
distribution of wealth and, thus, on the welfare of consumers and
cannot be ignored in enforcement if the welfare of consumers is an
accepted policy goal.
1. Entry barriers and distributional equity
One obvious decision point at which distributional concerns can
be factored into the enforcement equation involves the ability of
potential competitors to enter a market in which a firm is exercis-
to the issue of allocative efficiency. The term of art "consumer welfare," often
used when discussing the efficiency effects of mergers and restraints of trade,
refers to the concept of allocative efficiency. A transfer of wealth from consum-
ers to firms with market power does not diminish "consumer welfare." For the
unwary Judge or practitioner stumbling upon this term it is important to un-
derstand this fact and to further understand that "consumer welfare," when
used in this manner, has nothing to do with the welfare of consumers.
NAAG Guidelines, supra note 199, at S-4 n.15.
This assertion is not entirely correct. Insofar as consumers are the members of society for
whose utility allocative efficiency makes available a more valuable assortment of products,
consumers are made better off by a focus on "consumer welfare" as that term of art is
employed. To say that "consumer welfare" has nothing to do with the distribution of wealth
among economic actors would be more accurate.
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ing market power and charging supracompetitive prices. Contrast-
ing the federal and state horizontal merger guidelines illustrates
how the desire to minimize the transfer of wealth from consumers
to producers can be implemented in merger law enforcement. The
Justice Department Guidelines recognize that if entry into an in-
dustry is easy, then a firm acquiring the ability to raise prices to a
supracompetitive level will be unable to do so for very long without
attracting competition. If entry sufficient to introduce competitive
pricing into the market is likely to occur within two years of the
merger, then it is less likely that the merger will be challenged.20 2
Note that during this period, consumers may be paying prices
higher than marginal cost, thereby producing the presumably un-
desirable wealth transfer from consumers to the seller as well as
the allocative inefficiency resulting from the supply restriction that
accompanies the price increase. Although entry may ultimately
correct the allocative inefficiency as new firms enter the market,
bid the price down, and increase output to the allocatively efficient
level, both the deadweight loss during the two-year period of cor-
rection and the wealth transfer during this period are not recap-
tured. From a cost-benefit standpoint, both are costs of allowing
the market to correct the inefficiencies. Focusing only on the dead-
weight loss due to allocative inefficiencies underestimates the costs
of market adjustment. Including the social cost of distributional
inequity may lead to the selection of a shorter period by which
meaningful entry must be accomplished.
Recognizing that consumer welfare is harmed by an excessively
long adjustment period, the states' guidelines adopt a standard
that requires proof of the likelihood of easy and meaningful entry
within one year: "While entry requiring longer than this period of
time can eventually discipline the exercise of market power, during
a year consumers will suffer signficant harm of the precise nature
which the law was primarily enacted to prevent.
20 3
2. Productive efficiency and distributional equity
In general, the discussion of allocative and productive efficiency
can be carried out without reference to who gains and who loses as
202. NAAG Guidelines, supra note 199, at S-9.
203. Id.
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a result of inefficiencies. By preventing allocative inefficiencies, so-
ciety's scarce resources are allocated among their alternative uses
in a fashion that maximizes their value. By improvements in pro-
ductive efficiency, the quantities of scarce resources used to supply
goods and services is reduced, freeing resources for alternative
uses. As a result of the pursuit of both economic goals, the eco-
nomic pie to be divided among members of the society is
expanded.
Occasionally, and most particularly in the merger area, pursuit
of allocative efficiency by preventing the acquisition of market
power will interfere with the promotion of productive efficiency. In
fact, the Justice Department Guidelines recognize productive effi-
ciencies as "[t]he primary benefit of mergers to the economy"2 °4
and the prevention of the creation or enhancement of market
power through mergers as the "[t]he unifying theme of the Guide-
lines,"20 while considering the enforcement dilemna as the at-
tempt to "mediate between these dual concerns."20 6 Professor Oli-
ver Williamson has formalized this balancing of productive
efficiency gains and allocative efficiency losses that may result from
a merger in several articles, describing a partial equilibrium "naive
trade-off model" and illustrating cases in which the efficiency gains
and losses might be balanced to permit an otherwise objectionable
merger.20 7 His most influential argument is that both the allocative
efficiency losses and the productive efficiency gains from a pro-
posed merger are measurable with reference to a partial equilib-
rium model of projected changes in the quantity demanded of the
product in question, the price charged to consumers, and the cost
204. Justice Guidelines, supra note 23, at S-8.
205. Id. at S-1.
206. Id.
207. Williamson, supra note 40, at 706; see Williamson, Aliocative Efficiency and the
Limits of Antitrust, supra note 188, at 114-17. A partial equilibrium model focuses atten-
tion on a single market while assuming that conditions in other markets remain unchanged.
For a discussion of the use of partial equilibrium models in economics, see C. FERGUSON,
MIcROECONomic THEORY 12 (3d ed. 1972). Interpreting the meaning of "market" broadly, a
partial equilibrium model assumes, for the sake of analytical simplification, that policy mak-
ers are unconcerned with any ramifications of changes in prices and output levels other than
those reflected in the market for the product in question. For instance, Williamson's partial
equilibrium model projects cases in which cost savings, i.e., productive efficiencies, more
than offset allocative efficiency losses resulting when the quantity of the good supplied de-
creases as price increases, ignoring other effects of the quantity and price changes.
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of producing the product. He concludes that by balancing these
costs and benefits, policy makers can decide whether to challenge a
merger.
When the gains to society from increased productive efficiency
outweigh the losses due to allocative inefficiency, allowing the
merger to occur results in a net efficiency gain. Williamson's en-
couraging estimates indicate that if demand is relatively elastic
(that is, quantity demanded decreases rather sharply in response
to a price increase), a five percent increase in price can be offset by
a .44% cost savings; if demand is relatively inelastic (little re-
sponse to a price increase), only a .06% cost savings is needed. For
larger price increases, larger cost savings are required; for example,
a twenty percent price hike would require a 10.38% cost savings
for a demand elasticity of 3 while a 1.10% cost savings would be
required for a demand elasticity of .5.208
Using the same information necessary to project the cost savings
to offset a price increase in any particular case, antitrust enforcers
could readily estimate the wealth transfer resulting from a price
increase; and the tradeoff calculus can be expanded to take into
account the social costs of the wealth transfer. If, for instance, pol-
icy makers were to consider that a dollar transferred away from
consumers was a dollar lost to society (an admittedly extreme posi-
tion), then the cost savings would have to increase above the
amount necessary to offset the allocative efficiency loss by an
amount equal to the price increase. For a five percent price in-
crease, then, the cost savings to offset both the allocative efficiency
loss and the wealth transfer would have to be more than twelve
times greater than that estimated by Williamson (5.44% rather
than .44%) for the elastic demand case and more than eighty-four
times greater for the inelastic demand case (5.06% rather than
.06%). For a larger price increase, for example, twenty percent, the
cost savings would have to be as much as 30.38% for the elastic
demand case.2"9
The importance of the wealth transfer is a political question, of
course, but state Attorneys General, among others, have identified
208. Williamson, supra note 40, at 709.
209. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 14, at 1632-33, 1644-50 (discussing the interplay of
distributional concerns and efficiency goals).
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this wealth transfer concern as "the explicit and predominant con-
cern of the Congress." 10 The examples in the previous paragraph
gave a great deal of weight to preventing wealth transfers. One can
sensibly argue that because producers and consumers are all mem-
bers of society, it should be indifferent about who gets the money.
This is the conventional welfare economics model. 211 Even Wil-
liamson recognizes that accepting the goal of preventing wealth
transfer "merely requires that appropriate weights be specified 2 12
for the relative importance of producer and consumer interests so
that the tradeoff between various objectives including allocative
and productive efficiency can be made.21 3
Although it is inconsistent with both legislative history of the
antitrust statutes and Supreme Court precedent to believe that the
welfare of consumers, as reflected in wealth transfer, is irrelevant
to antitrust enforcement, it is certainly a respectable political posi-
tion. The point is, however, that it is a political position and,
whatever the consensus about the importance of this goal, it can be
incorporated in a systematic way into the merger law enforcement
calculus.
Ignoring the welfare of consumers merely covers up the difficul-
ties of decision making in a democratic society in which a variety
210. NAAG Guidelines, supra note 199, at S-3:
Goals such as productive efficiency, though subsidiary to the central goal of
preventing wealth transfers from consumers to firms possessing market power,
are often consistent with this primary purpose. When the productive efficiency
of a firm increases, (its cost of production is lowered) the firm may pass on
some of the savings to consumers in the form of lower prices. However, there is
little likelihood that a productively efficient firm with market power would
pass along savings to consumers. To the limited extent that Congress was con-
cerned with productive efficiency in enacting these laws, it prescribed the pre-
vention of high levels of market concentration as the means to this end. Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court has clearly ruled that any conflict between the
goal of preventing anticompetitive mergers and that of increasing efficiency
must be resolved in favor of the former explicit and predominant concern of
the Congress.
Id. at S-3 (footnotes omitted).
211. Williamson, supra note 40, at 711. See also Harberger, Three Basic Postulates for
Applied Welfare Economics: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. EcoN. LIT. 785, 785 (1971).
212. Williamson, supra note 40, at 711.
213. Williamson also suggests that specific products for which the interests of users de-
serve greater weight than those of the sellers may exist; but he disparages the notion of a
societal preference against producer interests. Id.
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of goals simultaneously inform political outcomes. The reliance on
partial equilibrium models encourages this simplicity in policy
making. Analyzing efficiency effects is easier if other effects are
omitted and undoubtedly economic theory has advanced greatly
due to this approach. The exclusion of an effect on another actor
for analytical purposes, however, does not justify exclusion of the
effect for policy formation purposes. For better or worse, this par-
tial equilibrium perspective contains no analysis of the interests of
people who might be laid-off as a result of the decreased level of
production. Whether the effect on employees of a merger is an ap-
propriate concern is a political question rather than an economic
one. The antitrust laws are undeniably political constructs and it is
not irrational to treat the results of partial equilibrium analyses as
only partial information on the social tradeoffs one might make in
deciding whether to permit a merger.
V. CONCLUSION - SOCIAL EFFICIENCY AND THE NONEFFICIENCY
GoALs
A traditional course in neoclassical microeconomic theory typi-
cally begins with a study of the nature of the utility function,
which describes the preferences of the individual. 14 The objective
of the consumer, as described by the economic actor's utility func-
tion, is to maximize his level of satisfaction given his preferences,
which guide his tradeoffs between alternative desires, and his
available wealth, which constrains his acquisitions and forces him
to make choices. Typically, economists consider that the items that
make people better off are purchases of goods and services. Ac-
cordingly, economists predict that a consumer arranges his
purchases to make himself as well off as possible given his limited
income.215 There is, of course, no reason to limit the analysis of an
individual's well-being to goods and services. If it were as numeri-
cally convenient to measure political freedom, for instance, as it is
to count an individual's consumption of grapefruit, there would be
no theoretical reason why the price of political freedom could not
214. See, e.g., J. HENDERSON & P QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY ch. 2 (2d ed. 1971); C.
FERGUSON, supra note 207, ch. 1.
215. See, e.g., C. FERGUSON, supra note 207, at 35.
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be considered a constraint on the amount of political freedom one
could enjoy.
The same analytical framework applies to decision making by a
firm. The preferences of the owner or manager of the firm deter-
mine the choices she will make; a profit-maximizing owner might
allocate resources differently than a growth or sales maximizing
manager, or differently from an owner who simply wants a quiet,
stable life. Given the underlying preferences, microeconomics
predicts that the decision maker will recognize constraints on her
ability to make greater profits, or increase sales or growth. Con-
sumer demand affects the ability to sell more output as certainly
as the consumer's wealth constrains his ability to satisfy all his
wants. Once again, while recognizing that owners and managers
may have a wide variety of preferences,21  neoclassical
microeconomics typically proceeds on the assumption that a firm's
only goal is profit maximization. This assumption is necessary, at
least in part, because incorporating measurements of profit into
quantitative analyses is easier.2 17
Similar to these theories of "optimizing" behavior is the theory
of the public household, which recognizes that individuals have
public preferences as well as private preferences; that is, individu-
als have desires that are satisfied by public provision as well as
wants that are satisfied by private acquisition. Professor Richard
Musgrave, in his classic work on public finance, describes social
wants as those that "cannot be satisfied through the mechanism of
the market because their enjoyment cannot be made subject to
price payments."21 Because the market fails to reveal consumer
preferences for social wants, the political process is substituted for
the market mechanism and through the political process prefer-
216. See, e.g., J. KOCH, supra note 49, ch. 3 (considers a variety of alternative motivations
for firm owners/managers, including sales maximization, growth maximization, managerial
behavior, "Realism in Process," and game theory).
217. Id. at 48: "On the grounds that profit maximization is undoubtedly a major goal of
the firm, and also because it is a useful point of departure for our studies, we shall proceed
to assume profit maximization as the basic motivating force of the firm." Koch does provide
a thorough review of the objections to this assumption at an elementary level. See id. ch. 3.
See also F. SCHERER, supra note 48, at 35-37 (acknowledging that management compensa-
tion schemes based on sales volume may induce corporations to maximize sales to the detri-
ment of profits).
218. R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC ECONOMY 9 (1959).
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ences are revealed, however imperfectly. The appropriate level of
provision of social wants to satisfy preferences democratically re-
vealed is subject to resource constraints in the same manner as pri-
vate acquisitions. The difficulty in maximizing social utility lies not
in conceptualizing the process of obtaining the correct balance of
desired objectives, but in determining what those objectives are
and what balance to strike.219
The notions of allocative and productive efficiency, as described
in Part III, involve striking the correct balance among alternative
goods and services that satisfy private demands of consumers. By
focusing antitrust enforcement on the provision of goods and ser-
vices, allocative efficiency ignores wants that are not traded on the
market, the entire spectrum of preferences that are revealed
through the democratic process.
The preference for allocative efficiency is itself not revealed
through a market process. Although a larger economic pie results
from more efficiently allocating scarce resources to the production
of goods and services, demand for that larger pie is reflected
through the political process, in a political marketplace. In that po-
litical marketplace, the larger pie is a particularly attractive com-
modity, but it competes with other characteristics of a good soci-
ety. The process of achieving a socially efficient result necessarily
requires resolving conflicting demands among politically appealing
alternatives given potential conflicts among them and scarce re-
sources with which to satisfy them. Society may choose character-
istics of its economic pie that make it taste better or look better or
have a more pleasing texture and sacrifice the size of the portions,
which, after all, is only one characteristic of the dessert.
In merger policy, the nonefficiency concerns represent the tex-
ture, color, and taste of our society-the cultural ambiance. The
hypotheses this Article investigates suggest that the characteristics
of a good society come from political and entrepreneurial freedom,
from community, and from individual control over our economic
destinies. The Nation has become familiar with the sacrifice of low
cost goods and services in exchange for other social wants, particu-
larly in areas in which private activity results in detrimental public
effects. Economic analysis in those areas recognizes that along with
219. Id. at 12.
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the production of goods comes the production of harms; environ-
mental pollution resulting from private productive activity is an
easily recognized example. It is well recognized that the efficient
level of output of a product, or, in general, the efficient level of any
activity, depends not only on the value of the activity relative to
alternative investments of materials and energies, but also on the
value or cost of benefits or harms that accompany that activity.
The expanded notion of social efficiency requires a balancing of
marginal benefits and marginal costs, incorporating all sources of
benefit and cost. For antitrust policy, this notion means that the
prevention of mergers whose probable ill effects, including price ef-
fects, political effects, distributional effects, employment effects, as
well as effects on communities and competitors, must be balanced
against the positive benefits, including enhanced productive effi-
ciency, freedom to contract without governmental intervention,
and freedom to dispose of one's property. A partial equilibrium
analysis, in which only one set of effects is considered, is hardly the
only way to proceed in rational policy formation. Environmental
law, for instance, explicitly recognizes the multiplicity of values in-
herent in democratic policy making. The Clean Air Act requires
consideration of effects of environmental policy on a variety of in-
terests that are not strictly allocative efficiency concerns; these in-
clude the effect of regulations on employment and communities,22
on consumer costs, on inflation, on recession, and on small busi-
nesses. 2 ' The methodology for balancing a variety of benefits and
costs is well recognized in the literature.222
Political and social as well as allocative and productive efficiency
effects of mergers are all identifiable as results of private behavior,
the benefits or costs from which are not all internalized by the pri-
vate economic actor, the acquiring firm. When considerations other
220. 42 U.S.C. § 7621 (1982).
221. Id. § 7617.
222. See, e.g., P. DOWNING, ENVIRONMENTAL EcONOMICS AND POLIcY 26-35 (1984). For more
specific applications, see Barnes, Back Door Cost-Benefit Analysis Under a Safety-First
Clean Air Act, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 827, 844-45 (1983) (discussing the cost-justified level of
pollution reduction, incorporating the various marginal costs associated with environmental
enforcement); Downing & Watson, The Economics of Enforcing Air Pollution Controls, 1 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 219 (1974) (discussing the importance of including a wide variety of
costs and the types of costs).
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than size of the economic pie are relevant to policy formation, effi-
ciency concerns have no greater inherent claim for priority. It
would be consistent with other forms of externalities regulation to
require enforcers to consider nonefficiency concerns, such as those
suggested in the proposed Merger Limitation Act of 1987.223 Such
consideration would require proponents of some mergers to estab-
lish that there would be no detrimental effects on nonefficiency
concerns, such as interests of local communities and affected em-
ployees, or on industrial concerns, such as technological innovation
and foreign competition, and on efficiency concerns.
The importance to society of any particular set of values is
translated into law through the democratic process, which reveals,
however imperfectly, the priority to be attached to conflicting
goals. This Article should not be interpreted as advocating the pri-
macy of one set of goals over another or, for that matter, advocat-
ing the inclusion of any particular efficiency or nonefficiency con-
cern in antitrust enforcement policy. This Article is a response to
the domination of policy making by the view that allocative and
productive efficiency are the only concerns worthy of consideration
in antitrust policy formation. Although potentially a rich analytical
tool, neoclassical economics has focused attention on a narrow set
of objectives, not because it is incapable of analyzing complex and
conflicting concerns, but because it is analytically simpler and
more satisfying to use a partial equilibrium framework based on
straightforward assumptions about the behavior of individuals that
yields a definitive answer. The trap is sprung when policy makers
forget that the economic analysis is based on simplifying assump-
tions. Neither individual nor societal preferences are straightfor-
ward; the legislative history of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, and
other political, judicial, and scholarly commentary, reveal a vast
array of ideals to be served by the protection of competition.
The response of current antitrust enforcers and pro-efficiency
commentators is that social and political goals of antitrust are too
vague, too mushy, and too unstructured to be appropriate for con-
sideration. The motivation for excluding these goals is the same as
the motivation for engaging in partial equilibrium economic analy-
sis that ignores effects outside the narrowly defined market under
223. H.R. 3090, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CoNG. REc. 7078, E3242 (1987).
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consideration-straightforward answers with as few qualifications
as possible. A more rigorous response to the policy problem would
be to consider how analysis of nonefficiency goals might be struc-
tured to make it more susceptible to the powerful analytical tools
available.
The thrust of this Article has been to define and articulate social
and political goals in a way that will make them susceptible to
analysis. The only view expressed is that it is inappropriate in a
democracy to reject nonefficiency goals as a foundation for policy
without a closer look at theoretical and empirical support for the
hypothesized relationships between characteristics of firms and
markets and the political and social phenomena that motivated
Congress to protect the competitive process.
